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Many scholars have invoked the term "disruptive innovation"
when addressing the platform (sharing) economy, with sweeping claims
about the dramatic changes this development promises for law,
regulation, and the economy. The challenges raised by the platform
economy are surely important, but we argue that recent scholarship
focusing on the immediacy and novelty of the platform economy has been
ahistorical, and has therefore missed the bigger picture about how to
regulate it. History is full of technological and management advances
that fundamentally disrupted business models for a brief period of time.
When business innovation upends a preexisting business model in a
regulated industry, the result can be a disjunction between the structure
of the regulatory system governing incumbent firms and the firms
disrupting the industry: a policy disruption. Policy disruption can result
from conscious choices by entrepreneurs to exploit legal loopholes or to
challenge regulatory protections for incumbents. But it can just as easily
result from gaps in a regulatory regime or fundamentally new business
models that solve problems legal regimes have been designed to address.
This Article is the first to offer a comprehensive analytical framework of
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how business innovation can create policy disruption and how
regulators should respond. We develop a three-step process that should
guide regulators in responding to policy disruptions, suggesting that, as
a default, regulators should strive to be neutral as between incumbents
and innovators. We conclude by offering specific policy instruments that
regulators can use to draft laws more neutrally to avoid or limit such
policy disruptions in the future.
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INTRODUCTION
The platform economy (also known as the "sharing economy")
has recently burst onto the scene as the hot topic in legal scholarship.'
1. These new economic relationships have been called the "sharing economy," "collaborative
consumption," the "mesh," and the "gig economy," among other monikers, each of which captures
some, but not all, features of these new economic relationships. RACHEL BOTSMAN & ROO ROGERS,
WHAT'S MINE IS YOURS: THE RISE OF COLLABORATIVE CONSUMPTION 67 (2010); ROBIN CHASE,
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The internet's virtual elimination of transaction costs between service
providers and customers has enabled entirely new markets to emerge
for renting out rooms, using private cars for rides, hiring labor for small
tasks, and selling other goods and services. The rise of the platform
economy has been proclaimed as revolutionary, disrupting and
destroying long-established competitors, and forcing us to rethink
regulation of entire sectors. 2
This business innovation certainly raises a wide range of
important legal issues: Should service providers be considered
employees of the firm managing the platform? Who bears liability for
harm caused during service provision? Should legacy (and now-
threatened) service providers such as hotels and taxi drivers be given
special protections or compensation based on their reliance interests in
the old legal regime? Regulators, policymakers, and scholars around the
nation have been exploring how the law and legal institutions should
adapt (or not) to the challenges posed by the practices of upstart
companies such as Airbnb and Uber. Legal scholars have made
sweeping claims about the dramatic changes that the platform economy
promises for law, regulation, and the economy.3
PEERS INC.: How PEOPLE AND PLATFORMS ARE INVENTING THE COLLABORATIVE ECONOMY AND
REINVENTING CAPITALISM 18 (2015); LISA GANSKY, THE MESH: WHY THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS IS
SHARING (2010); BRAD STONE, THE UPSTARTS: How UBER, AIRBNB, AND THE KILLER COMPANIES OF
THE NEW SILICON VALLEY ARE CHANGING THE WORLD (2017); Rachel Botsman, Defining the
Sharing Economy: What is Collaborative Consumption-And What Isn't?, FAST COMPANY (May 27,
2015), https://www.fastcompany.com/3046119/defining-the-sharing-economy-what-is-
collaborative-consumption-and-what-isnt#12 [https://perma.cclHEX5-HUFG] (noting conflicting
definitions); Mark R. Warner, Asking Tough Questions About the Gig Economy, WASH. POST (June
18, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/asking-tough-questions-about-the-gig-
economy/2015/06/18/b43f2d0a-1461-11e5-9ddc-e335354210c_story.html [https://perma.cc/GN4F-
T7X3]. We adopt the term "platform economy" for purposes of this Article, both to signify the
common denominator of using online apps to match providers with users, such as lodging rental
"hosts" and "guests" and ride-for-hire "drivers" and "passengers," and to clarify that the underlying
transactions are commercial, rather than based on gratuitous sharing. See Orly Lobel, The Law of
the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87 (2016) (discussing the platform economy). We acknowledge
that genuine sharing does occur in some contexts. See Mich6le Finck & Sofia Ranchordas, Sharing
and the City, 49 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 1299 (2017) (designing a sharing taxonomy differentiating
between noncommercial "couch surfing" and commercial enterprises like Uber); Kellen Zale,
Sharing Property, 87 COLO. L. REV. 501 (2016) (same). However, our focus is on the commercialized
version.
2. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 1 (discussing how the platform economy is disrupting
regulated industries and causing a shift in legal theory); Irving Wladawsky-Berger, The Rise Of
The Platform Economy, WALL STREET J.: CIO J. (Feb. 12, 2016, 3:26 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2016/02/12/the-rise-of-the-platform-economy/ [https://perma.cclGPW6-
DJ8B] (discussing how "(p]latform companies are major drivers of innovation" and how
"[t]raditional companies are challenged to keep up or risk being left behind").
3. See, e.g., Yanelys Crespo, Uber v. Regulation: "Ride-Sharing" Creates a Legal Gray Area,
25 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 79 (2016) (summarizing Uber's various legal challenges); Nestor
Davidson & John Infranca, The Sharing Economy as an Urban Phenomenon, 34 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 215, 222 (2016) (discussing how the sharing economy will "impact the broader regulatory
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Pushing back against this flurry of excitement, we argue both
that scholarship about the platform economy has been ahistorical and
that this lack of perspective matters. Scholarship focusing on the
immediacy and novelty of the platform economy has missed the bigger
picture. In fact, in important ways, the platform economy's interaction
with the legal system does not raise fundamentally new questions from
a law and policy perspective. To be sure, the ascendance of the platform
economy is both innovative and potentially disruptive to incumbents.
But that's a well-worn story, and has been the case time and again in
different markets for well over a century.
From a business or economic perspective, history is full of
technological and management advances that fundamentally disrupted
business models over a brief period of time. 4 Over the past century,
commercial innovation, driven both by technological changes and
innovation in how entrepreneurs choose to organize their firms, has
arisen periodically in a kind of punctuated equilibrium with policy
disruption. The platform economy is the latest chapter in an ongoing
story. Consider the advent of the telephone over the telegraph, the rise
of franchising over independent service providers, or the triumph of
suburban mall and big-box stores over small Main Street vendors.
From a legal perspective, we argue that these bursts of business
innovation-only some of which are "disruptive" from a business theory
perspective 5-pose a recurring question, one that is at the heart of how
the regulatory state operates.6 A regulatory program generally-even
necessarily-presumes a certain kind of organizational form for the
landscape of city life, necessitating a new, holistic approach to urban governance"); Lobel, supra
note 1, at 91 ("[Tjhe platform economy is presenting not only a paradigmatic shift for business, but
also for legal theory."); Stephen R. Miller, First Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy, 54
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 147, 149 (2016) (discussing how "many sharing economy businesses have
violated state or local government laws" and how "the mass scale of the sharing economies' non-
compliance with local government laws can be rectified"); Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher,
Like Uber, But for Local Governmental Policy: The Future of Local Regulation of the "Sharing
Economy," 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 901 (2016) (arguing that local and state governments will neither shut
down the platform economy nor let it evolve free of regulation, but rather will design "mixed
regulatory strategies"); Brishen Rogers, Employment Rights in the Platform Economy: Getting
Back to Basics, 10 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 479 (2016) (discussing the platform economy's impact on
employment regulation using Uber as a case study); Kellen Zale, When Everything is Small: The
Regulatory Challenge of Scale in the Sharing Economy, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 949 (2016) (same).
4. Examples from business management literature are discussed infra Section I.A. For a
discussion of other historical case studies, see infra Part II.
5. See infra Section L.A (discussing business theory of disruptive versus sustaining
innovation).
6. The platform economy also presents challenges for private law regimes such as property,
tort, and contract law, which are not our focus. See Chad G. Marzen, Darren A. Prum & Robert J.
Aalberts, The New Sharing Economy: The Role of Property, Tort and Contract Law for Managing
the Airbnb Model, 13 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 295 (2017).
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activities that it regulates. It has to determine the units of regulation
that will be the subject of permitting, monitoring, standard setting, and
compliance and enforcement efforts. Those units of regulation will
usually be related to the business model of the regulated industry-
either as a result of a conscious public policy choice, or as a result of an
implicit choice that the regulatory structure most sensibly applies when
its structure interfaces well with the industry's business model.7 When
business innovation upends that preexisting model, the result is a
disjunction between the structure of the regulatory system and the
industry that is being regulated: a policy disruption.
We contend that there are four primary types of policy
disruption: End-runs, Exemptions, Gaps, and Solutions, each of which
requires a different regulatory response. Policy disruption can result
from conscious choices by entrepreneurs to exploit ambiguous laws
(End-runs) or express legal loopholes (Exemptions). But it can just as
easily result from business innovations to which the existing regulatory
regime simply does not apply (Gaps).8 For example, everyone might
agree that all providers of rental rooms should ensure that the rooms
provide an adequate egress for occupants in the event of a fire or
earthquake. However, determining how to ensure compliance with that
standard will pose fundamentally different questions when the
presumption is that the regulated entity is a 500-room hotel with a full-
time staff that can meet with the local fire chief to facilitate the
necessary inspections, compared with when the provider of the room is
a single-family homeowner who rents out her spare bedroom ten days a
year through Airbnb, and has a full-time job that prevents her from
making an appointment with a fire inspector during regular business
hours.
Existing regulations can effectively bar entry to new business
models that do not match the requirements or assumptions of the
regulatory system. And some of these business innovations can solve
problems that regulatory systems are designed to address (Solutions).
If every homeowner seeking to use third-party financing to install solar
7. Analogous issues arise in the context of allocating regulatory power among federal, state,
and local governments when the existing allocation of authority presumes certain forms of
business organization or certain basic technologies. For discussion of how business and
technological innovation can upend existing understandings of federalism, see Sarah E. Light,
Precautionary Federalism and the Sharing Economy, 66 EMORY L.J. 333 (2017) [hereinafter Light,
Precautionary Federalism] (discussing how the rise of Uber and Lyft require a precautionary
approach to the allocation of regulatory authority). Cf. Sarah E. Light, Advisory Nonpreemption,
95 WASH. U. L. REV. 325 (2017) [hereinafter Light, Advisory Nonpreemption] (discussing how
autonomous vehicles disrupt the allocation of regulatory authority for vehicle safety between the
federal and state governments).
8. See infra Section I.B (offering a taxonomy of ways in which policy disruption can occur).
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panels on her roof must obtain contract preapproval from the state
public utilities commission, this legal requirement will effectively
prohibit the expansion of distributed solar generation. Such barriers to
entry may reflect efforts by entrenched industry incumbents to protect
themselves against competition. But clearly not all regulatory barriers
to entry reflect conscious public policy or rent-seeking choices-they
may instead result from implicit assumptions about how the world
worked when the regulation was written. And there may have been
valid public policy reasons to prefer one type of firm as a provider of
goods or services over other types. But business innovation should force
us to question these assumptions.
In our view, the question of whether Uber's avoidance of existing
taxi regulations is a free-market blow against entrenched incumbents,
or instead is an effort by greedy Silicon Valley investors to undermine
essential consumer and worker protection, is to a certain extent beside
the point. Even if we wanted to keep the exact same regulatory
standards for Uber as for the existing taxi industry, we would still have
to wrestle with difficult questions about how to structure our regulatory
system to incorporate the new business model.
At that point, a regulator necessarily has to make a choice about
how (or even whether) to regulate the innovative business. The
regulator may choose to prevent the innovator from entering the
market, preserve the existing regulatory structure, develop new
regulatory structures that match the new business structure, or allow
the innovation to proceed without updating the regulatory structure
(and thereby likely doom the existing regulatory structure to
extinction). In each case, the regulator must likewise decide whether
reliance interests in the existing system require some kind of
compensation for incumbents threatened by the new market entrants.
How the regulator ought to respond, we contend, depends
fundamentally on the values that we want our regulatory structure to
promote, including efficiency, innovation, and protection of the public
interest. In our view, to effectuate these normative values, existing
legal rules (and any new rules drafted) should be interpreted as a
default not to be tied too closely to a specific form of business
organization. Instead, the law should strive for "organizational
neutrality," not privileging one form of business organization over
another. 9 The organizational neutrality principle offers the best way to
9. A scholar of corporate law first used the term "organizational neutrality" in offering a
positive account of the Supreme Court's muddled jurisprudence on corporate constitutional rights.
Vincent S.J. Buccola, Corporate Rights and Organizational Neutrality, 101 IOWA L. REV. 499, 502-
03 (2016). The general principle requires that "the burden of actual or potential regulation should
1566 [Vol. 70:5:1561
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balance the competing concerns of (1) preserving incentives for business
innovation that do not penalize newcomers or new forms of organization
while (2) reducing incentives for regulatory arbitrage that would do the
opposite-privilege new forms of business over incumbents. Finally, a
default principle of neutrality has the potential to render legal rules
more durable as new forms of business organization arise, because the
law's application would not depend upon the particular form of
organization selected by entrepreneurs and would allow regulators to
determine that the public interest can outweigh the norm of neutrality
in some cases.
Seen in this light, the debates over whether and how the
regulatory system should adjust to the rise of platforms such as Uber
are not fundamentally new at all. The basic question is whether the
regulatory structure that assumed the existence of centrally owned,
dispatched taxi fleets with dedicated vehicles and drivers can be
interpreted flexibly to apply to ride-sharing platforms that "rent"
vehicles from driver-partners but for which (arguably) there is no
central owner or operator, versus whether that regulatory system
should be supplemented or replaced with an entirely new structure. The
answer should be informed by concerns about promoting business
innovation, protecting the public interest, and asking whether reliance
interests should be compensated.
In the pages that follow, we show how the administrative state's
responses to past business innovations shed light on its current
responses to the platform economy. Managing the next disruptive
innovation, wherever it may appear, is even more important.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a primer on
business innovation theory and relates it to policy design. We
disaggregate the concepts of disruptive business innovation and policy
disruption to make clear that one does not always follow from the other.
We offer a taxonomy of pathways through which business innovation
leads to policy disruption that ultimately informs the solutions we will
propose to these recurrent problems. Part II moves from theory to
practice, grounding our analysis in historic case studies about the
not affect the mode of organization through which entrepreneurs choose to coordinate group
activity." Id. at 503. While we take no position on whether this principle explains the Court's
corporate constitutional rights jurisprudence, we argue that the general concept of neutrality
among business forms offers a meaningful normative principle to guide regulators in addressing
the problem of regulatory disruption and extend it to this new context. See infra Part III. Although
Buccola's article focuses on neutrality among legal corporate forms (e.g., corporation versus
partnership), our analysis argues for neutrality across the range of business organizational forms
or models, regardless of the specific legal corporate form. Accordingly, when we refer to "form" in
this Article, our reference is to the broader concept.
2017] 1567
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regulation of franchising and energy production. Each case reveals
basic lessons about when and how business innovation has led to policy
disruption, demonstrating the recurring nature of this problem.
Building on these insights, Part III develops a theoretical
framework and decisions flow chart for the regulation of innovative
business models. In the face of any innovative business model that
creates policy disruption, regulators have four primary regulatory
options. They need to consider whether to Block the new business model
from entering the market; to give the new business model a Free Pass,
such that existing rules would not apply; to apply the existing
regulatory structure, however imperfectly-a method we call OldReg;
or to develop a new regulatory structure entirely-what we call
NewReg. These questions, and the choices regulators face, were as
relevant in 1917 as they are in 2017. Part IV then applies this
framework to the challenges posed by the rise of distributed generation
and Tesla's efforts to sell its electric vehicles directly to customers. The
conclusion sets out specific policy instruments that regulators can use
to draft laws more neutrally to avoid or limit policy disruptions in the
future.
I. DISRUPTION THEORY IN BUSINESS AND POLICY
Disruption is the talk of the town thanks to the likes of Uber,
Lyft, TaskRabbit, Airbnb, and other upstarts of the platform economy.
Clearly, the platform economy is destabilizing the industries in which
it is gaining traction, but so what? Why should we care if Uber takes
rides away from taxis and Airbnb puts some hotels out of business?
Competition is good, and the fact that these innovative businesses are
wildly popular with consumers10 must mean that shaking up the
incumbent industry players is good, too. No one today mourns over the
demise of the buggy whip industry.
To be sure, by no means would we suggest that the economic
impacts often associated with an industry undergoing this kind of
"attack" from innovators are a trivial policy concern. Jobs may be lost,
incumbent businesses run into the ground, and investments shattered.
Entrenched interests will push back at every turn, lobbying regulators
for protectionist policies and suing the innovators on whatever basis
they can. In short, business "disruption" is called that precisely because




2017] REGULATING BUSINESS INNOVATION 1569
it is disruptive. The incumbents are not about to roll over without a
fight, and they may take the fight to legislatures, agencies, and courts.
The difference, of course, is that besides causing industry
upheaval, Uber, Airbnb, and other applications of the platform economy
often are also arguably illegal, if not patently illegal, in many
jurisdictions. They are routinely skirting and flouting existing federal,
state, and local laws. For example, many Airbnb "hosts" are violating
public zoning regulations and private covenant and lease agreements.
Uber and Lyft are embroiled in litigation and public investigations
regarding the legality of their treating "drivers" as independent
contractors. And until a number of jurisdictions began to adopt new
laws to govern "transportation network companies," Uber and Lyft were
arguably violating local regulations governing accepting rides for hire.1
There are also concerns that, while not technically illegal, some effects
of the platform economy are offensive to settled norms. For example,
some studies have suggested that many Airbnb "hosts" engage in
discriminatory practices that would be illegal under federal housing
discrimination laws but for exemptions covering room rentals by
11. Stories regarding specific examples of platform economy illegality abound. See, e.g.,
Contractor or Employee? Uber Drivers and the Future of Ridesharing, BERKELEY TECH. L.J.: BTLJ
BLOG (Apr. 13, 2016), http://btlj.org/2016/04/contractor-or-employee-uber-drivers-and-the-future-
of-ridesharing/ [https://perma.cclCU6S-6K4K]; Braden Dupuis, WHA Tenant Caught Listing Home
on Airbnb, PIQUE (Jan. 7, 2016), http://www.piquenewsmagazine.com/whistler/wha-tenant-
caught-listing-home-on-airbnb/Content?oid=2745251 [https://perma.cc/3SLA-VKJN]; Mike Isaac,
Justice Department Expands Its Inquiry into Uber's Greyball Tool, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/05/technology/uber-greyball-investigation-expands.html
[https://perma.ce/AZ7W-R5SJ (noting existing criminal investigation into whether Uber used a
technological tool to evade local law enforcement in several cities in which it was operating without
authorization); Elyce Kirchner & David Paredas, Uber and Lyft Drivers Told to Ignore Regulations:
Companies Pay Airport Citations for Drivers, NBC (Oct. 6, 2014, 4:37 PM),
http://www.nbcbayarea.com/investigations/Rideshare-Drivers-Told-to-Ignore-Regulations-Uber-
Lyft-will-pay-citations-at-Bay-Area-Airports-278283631.html [https://perma.cclPR29-Z4ST]; Rob
Lieber, A Warning for Hosts of Airbnb Travelers, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/01/your-money/a-warning-for-airbnb-hosts-who-may-be-
breaking-the-law.html [https://perma.cclR5ZW-MBTS]; Matt Lynley, Uber Was Just Busted for
Violating Taxi Regulations in Washington D.C., BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 13, 2012, 5:44 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-was-just-busted-for-violating-taxi-regulations-in-
washington-dc-2012-1 [https://perma.ccl4MD3-UV6Z]. For an entertaining history of these and
other legal battles platform economy enterprises have been fighting, see STONE, supra note 1, chs.
9-11. For accounts in legal scholarship of the various legal transgressions of platform economy
enterprises, see supra note 3. One recent paper argues that forcing changes in the law is a core
part of the business model of many firms in the platform economy, and refers to such efforts as
"regulatory entrepreneurship." Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory
Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REv. 383 (2017). For a discussion of how various states and some
local jurisdictions have begun to regulate Uber, Lyft, and other for-hire transportation platforms
in response to these efforts, see Light, Precautionary Federalism, supra note 7, at 376-82.
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homeowners. 12 Yet, consumers, investors, and the media are intoxicated
with the platform economy, so jurisdictions around the nation-indeed,
around the world-are grappling to find the right way to manage these
innovative businesses. In other words, they are not merely business
upheavals; they are also policy upheavals.
To be clear, not all business upheavals result in policy upheavals.
For example, contrast the policy controversies plaguing the platform
economy to what is held out as a classic example of a business
innovation with radical impacts on its industry-Netflix.13 Leveraging
the technological progression from VCRs to DVDs to streaming video,
Netflix created a new business model that eventually destroyed what
had been a booming incumbent brick-and-mortar movie rental industry,
exemplified by Blockbuster. 14 Netflix's mailed DVD business not only
initially served customers Blockbuster did not, such as those who could
not drive to a rental outlet, but also quickly made life easier for those
who preferred ordering movies online to driving to the video store. Its
later streaming service spelled the end of the brick-and-mortar rentals,
save for the Redbox kiosks at your local grocery store. At no point in the
history of this industry disruption, however, did any serious effort
mount to regulate the business innovation. No cities or states banned
Netflix from mailing DVDs to customers or, later, from streaming
media into homes. No employee or other interests of the brick-and-
mortar rental industry litigated to contest the entry of mailed DVDs or
streaming into the market. Even Blockbuster did not lobby regulators
or litigate to stop Netflix. Netflix transformed an industry, but this
business innovation did not create a policy upheaval. 15 Nor, of course,
12. See Benjamin G. Edelman et al., Racial Discrimination in the Sharing Economy: Evidence
from a Field Experiment, AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED EcON., April 2017, at 1, 16-18; Zale, supra note
3, at 955.
13. Clayton M. Christensen et al., What Is Disruptive Innovation?, HARv. Bus. REV., Dec.
2015, at 44, 48-49, https://hbr.org/2015/12/what-is-disruptive-innovation [https://perma.cc/9TVT-
KJS3] (describing Netflix in these terms).
14. For entertaining histories, see Michael Antonoff, How a Struggling Netflix Became the
New Blockbuster, USA TODAY (Jan. 23, 2015, 3:24 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
money/2015/01/23/antonoff-column-video-streaming-netflix-blockbuster/22209273/
[https://perma.cc/9GDF-QALK]; Rick Newman, How Netflix (and Blockbuster) Killed Blockbuster,
U.S. NEWS (Sept. 23, 2010, 2:06 PM), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/flowchart/
2010/09/23/how-netflix-and-blockbuster-killed-blockbuster [https://perma.cc/PYG4-JSW2].
15. This is not to say Netflix has faced no policy issues at all. For example, its practice of
penalizing subscribers who ordered more mailed DVDs with slower deliveries, known as throttling,
led to litigation. See Michael Liedtke, "Throttling" Angers Netflix Heavy Renters, BUS. WEEK
ONLINE (Feb. 10, 2005), https://web.archive.org/web/20060215072830/
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D8FMEGTOO.htm? [https://perma.cc/QG3H-
X9SS]. More recently, some jurisdictions have considered taxing internet-based video streaming
services such as Netflix to compensate for falling utility tax revenues from cable television as
people increasingly move from cable to internet. See Mike McPhate, California Today: Fretting
1570 [Vol. 70:5:1561
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are most policy upheavals-such as major regulatory changes in the
protection of the environment, civil rights, or people in the lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender communities-the result of business
upheavals.
In the siloed worlds of scholarship, business upheavals are of
great interest to business theorists, and policy upheavals are of great
interest to policy theorists. Our interest is in sorting out what to do
when they occur together in a causal relationship-when radical
transformation of an industry by a business innovation demands clear
thinking about whether a substantial policy response is appropriate
and, if so, in what form. We therefore need to lay a theoretical
foundation for understanding both components of the potent
combination-business and policy-and to establish some precision in
the language we employ. In that regard, we have been careful with how
we have used the term "disruption" thus far in connection with business
innovation, as it has a technical meaning in business theory that has
largely been ignored in the policy debate over the platform economy.
Equally so, however, the business theory of innovation has paid little
attention to the role of policy in constraining or facilitating the
innovative business agent of disruption. The two theory domains have
largely ignored each other. To bridge that gap, below we briefly trace
the development of business disruption theory, including its failure to
incorporate a policy dimension, and couple that with our own theory of
policy disruption.
A. What Is Business Disruption?
All business disruptions begin with business innovations. We
envision three business innovation scenarios that could lead to policy
concerns. First, an existing business could leverage a new technology to
produce a good or service, or deliver it to customers in a novel way. This
may happen if residential package delivery services start using drones,
and it did happen when Netflix started delivering videos to customers
through the mail and later through internet streaming. Second, a
business firm might organize itself in a new way to produce a good or
service. Examples include Uber "renting" vehicles from thousands of
private car owners rather than using central taxi fleets and distributed
over the "Netflix Tax," N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/28/
us/california-today-netflix-tax-video-streaming.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/4KDX-4PKB].
Ironically, Netflix sued Blockbuster for infringing upon its business method patents when
Blockbuster began to adapt its own practices to compete with Netflix. Reuters, Blockbuster Settles




generation firms relying on thousands of individual homeowners to
install solar panels that generate electricity rather than centralized
utilities to perform the same function. Third, a new technology might
create the space for an entirely new kind of business producing an
entirely new good or service, such as the advent of the telegraph. In
short, business innovation involves a new technology, a new form of
business organization, or both.
Indeed, new technologies and new forms of business organization
often go hand-in-hand, for good reason. Regarding the form of business
organization, an entrepreneur has many choices about how to organize
a business enterprise. 16 At one end of the spectrum, she may choose to
incorporate her enterprise into a hierarchical or centralized firm, in
which the corporation both owns the necessary capital equipment and
employs individuals to carry out the functions of the firm. At the other
end of the spectrum, an entrepreneur can enter into a series of contracts
within the market, use independent contractors rather than hire
employees, and rent, rather than own, capital equipment.17 Ronald
Coase recognized that transaction costs-including not only the relative
costs of renting versus owning, contracting versus employing, and
search costs, but also regulatory costs-affect whether entrepreneurs
choose to incorporate into firms, utilize markets, or choose some
intermediate form of organization.18 Entrepreneurs seek to minimize
16. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 387 (1937) (contrasting hierarchical
firms with disaggregated markets and contracts, and arguing that firms organize hierarchically
when doing so reduces the transaction costs that would be expended in markets); Oliver E.
Williamson, The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes, 19 J. EcON. LITERATURE
1537, 1537-39 (1981) (arguing that a firm is not merely a "production function," but rather a
"governance structure" that strives to minimize "transaction costs"); cf. Yochai Benkler, Coase's
Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002) (discussing "commons-
based peer production," including of software, and its transformation of traditional understandings
of the firm); Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing
as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273, 275 n.2 (2004) (discussing voluntary,
not-for-profit peer production of software such as Linux as a new, third form of economic
organization distinct from firms and markets); Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Regulating Sharing: The
Sharing Economy as an Alternative Capitalist System, 90 TUL. L. REV. 241, 245 (2015) ("[T]he
dissonance between participants in sharing markets and regulators goes to the very heart of
Americans' understanding of basic concepts such as 'markets,' 'business,' 'entrepreneurship,' and
'capitalism.' "). We note that our analysis here focuses primarily on for-profit business enterprise,
which is more likely to trigger regulatory responses than voluntary sharing agreements among
peers or neighbors.
17. Again, whether a firm is actually using independent contractors or merely asserting that
it is using independent contractors remains a question to be resolved by courts or regulators.
18. Coase, supra note 16, at 390 ("The main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm
would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism."). Transaction costs include
"discovering what the relevant prices are," negotiation costs, and regulatory costs, among others.
Id. at 390-93 ("[E]xchange transactions on a market and the same transactions organized within
a firm are often treated differently by Governments and other bodies with regulatory powers.");
see also Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Some Elementary Considerations, 63 AM.
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their transaction costs and production costs by selecting the most
efficient size and type of business organization. 19
Notably, Coase also anticipated that technological innovation
could affect the relative costs of managers' choices:
[Mlost inventions will change both the costs of organizing and the costs of using the price
mechanism. In such cases, whether the invention tends to make firms larger or smaller
will depend on the relative effect on these two sets of costs. For instance, if the telephone
reduces the costs of using the price mechanism more than it reduces the costs of
organising, then it will have the effect of reducing the size of the firm.2 0
This insight anticipates how the rise of smartphone technology
has eliminated certain transaction costs associated with matching
supply and demand in the transportation industry. It is now virtually
costless to match willing drivers with people needing rides.21 This
decrease in costs associated with markets has made it possible for Uber
and Lyft to avoid ownership of vehicles and instead to "rent" vehicles
through the market on a short-term basis from driver-partners based
solely on actual demand. The same can be said of Airbnb. Before the
advent of smartphones and platform technology, matching a person
seeking a couch to sleep on with willing couch providers was a daunting
and expensive task. Hotels had an advantage because of their constant
capacity to meet potential demand. Now, transaction costs of matching
supply and demand are minimal. In the context of electric power
generation, too, what once required large power plants with hundreds
or thousands of employees, and expensive, hazardous inputs like coal to
ECON. REV. 316, 316 (1973) (noting that nonmarket forms of business organization arise "whenever
the market, if used to complete a set of transactions, experiences 'frictions' "including institutional
and market failures such as opportunism, uncertainty, and administrative expenses); Williamson,
supra note 16, at 1357 ("[T]he modern corporation is mainly to be understood as the product of a
series of organizational innovations that have had the purpose and effect of economizing on
transaction costs."). The choice about where to locate on the continuum between hierarchies and
markets is not a binary one. Indeed, while Coase argued that "integration" involves the
"suppression of the price mechanism," firms can nonetheless employ internal "price"-based
mechanisms, such as internal carbon fees, to shape behavior within the hierarchy. Sarah E. Light,
The New Insider Trading: Environmental Markets Within the Firm, 34 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2015)
(discussing Microsoft's use of an internal carbon pricing mechanism to drive down emissions
within the firm).
19. Coase, supra note 16, at 397; Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310-11
(1976) (complicating this analysis by arguing that firms are not to be understood as "hierarchies,"
but rather as a "nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals," and contending
that it "makes little or no sense to try to distinguish those things which are 'inside' the firm ...
from those things that are 'outside' of it"); Williamson, supra note 18, at 316-18.
20. Coase, supra note 16, at 397 n.3.
21. See Lobel, supra note 1, at 14-19 (discussing ten efficiency-promoting features of the
platform economy); see also Benjamin G. Edelman & Damien Geradin, Efficiencies and Regulatory
Shortcuts: How Should We Regulate Companies like Airbnb and Uber?, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
293 (2016) (pointing out that the platform economy enterprises "allow service providers and
consumers to transact with each other without costly intermediaries").
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generate electricity, can now be achieved (at a smaller scale) through
the placement of inexpensive and safe solar panels on one's roof.
These technological innovations have changed the cost structure
of how goods- and services are provided in ways that affect
entrepreneurs' choices about how to organize their business
enterprises. 22 The same was true three centuries ago, however, when a
similarly structured "putting-out economy" arose. 23 But Coase's
insights on business organization and the role of technological
innovation in how to organize a firm do not get at the question of when
business innovation is disruptive, or even what that means. For one
thing, technological innovation need not have profound effects on
choices about business organization. Technological innovation could
simply make an existing firm better at what it does without major
changes in organizational form. For example, successive generations of
the smartphone have not fundamentally altered the organizational
form of Apple or Samsung. Likewise, an entrepreneur might devise a
new form of business organization as a business innovation without
relying on a new technology. Netflix, for example, initially relied on a
very old technology-the U.S. mail-to deliver DVDs to customers.
When is it, then, that business innovations that leverage a novel form
of business organization, a technological innovation, or both, become
disruptive-in the business theory sense-in the relevant industry?
Responding to that theme, today's dominant theory of business
innovation traces its roots to the seminal 1995 paper by Joseph Bower
and Clayton Christensen,24 which Christensen later expanded and
popularized in his influential book, The Innovator's Dilemma.25
22. Coase, supra note 16, at 341 (noting that an equilibrium in firm size is reached when "the
costs of organizing an extra transaction within the firm become equal to the costs of carrying out
the same transaction by means of an exchange in the open market or the costs of organizing in
another firm").
23. As political scientists Martin Kenney and John Zysman point out, in the putting-out
economy
that existed before factories . . . companies would ship materials to people to assemble
items such as shoes, clothing, or firearms in their homes. In the current manifestation
of putting out, the platform operator has unprecedented control over the compensation
for and organization of work, while still claiming to be only an intermediary.
Martin Kenney & John Zysman, The Rise of the Platform Economy, 32 ISSUES SCl. & TECH., Spring
2016, at 61, 62, http://issues.org/32-3/the-rise-of-the-platform-economy/ [https://perma.cc/66E7-
P5WD]. In other words, as a business model the platform economy is for the most part a teched-
up version of a business model that dominated our economy three hundred years ago.
24. Joseph L. Bower & Clayton M. Christensen, Disruptive Technologies: Catching the Wave,
HARv. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 43.
25. CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR'S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES
CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL (1997); see also Dan Yu & Chang Chieh Hang, A Reflective Review of




Christensen's work on technological innovation builds on earlier works
going as far back as Joseph Schumpeter's analysis of "creative
destruction." 26 Much as did Coase, this early body of work introduced a
series of key concepts regarding the relationship between technological
innovation and business innovation, differentiating between two
species in this respect. Under this framework, a sustaining business
innovation takes place within the value network of the established
firms and gives customers something more or better in the attributes
they already value. 27 Sustaining innovation often is leveraged through
an incremental technological innovation, which is a small step forward
in technology that allows the sustaining improvement. 28 An example
would be the iPhone's entry into the cell phone market with a better
product. 29 By contrast, disruptive business innovation begins outside of
the value network of the established firms and introduces a different
package of attributes from the one that mainstream customers
historically value, usually in the form of a lower-quality product or
service than established firms are marketing.30 Often a breakthrough
innovation in technology fuels the disruptive business innovation. 31 An
example would be the integration of internet access in hand-held cell
phones that ultimately generated advanced "smartphones" and
"tablets" that have displaced laptops as mainstream users' device of
choice. 32 While these smartphones initially offered a lower-quality
experience for surfing the internet than did laptop computers, the
market quickly grew to appreciate their convenience and simplicity,
and the product has improved over time.33
Christensen's theory has been enormously influential in
business management practice and academic discourse, 34 but has by no
26. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 83 (1942) (arguing
that the "opening up of new markets ... and the organizational development from the craft shop
and factory to such concerns as U.S. Steel illustrate the same process of industrial mutation ...
that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old
one, incessantly creating a new one"; and calling this dynamic "Creative Destruction"); Yu & Hang,
supra note 25, at 436 (noting this link).
27. Christensen et al., supra note 13, at 46-47.
28. Id. at 47-48.
29. Id. at 49.
30. Id. at 47.
31. Id. at 46.
32. Id. at 49-50.
33. Christensen recently complained that the two categories of innovation have been
conflated and that "[miany researchers, writers, and consultants use 'disruptive innovation' to
describe any situation in which an industry is shaken up and previously successful incumbents
stumble." Id. at 46.
34. One business scholar describes it as one of the rare instances when "[a] research project
resonates with the business community so profoundly that key ideas from the project make it into
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means been universally accepted among business theorists.35 We do not
aim to weigh in on the business theorists' debate over the precise
contours of business disruption, much less its merit as a theory. Rather,
for our purposes the takeaway message is this: from Coase to the
present debate sparked by Christensen's criteria for disruptive
innovation, the common thread in business theory is that meaningful
business innovation-the kind with ample potential to rattle the
incumbent firms in an industry-often involves the potent combination
of a novel (to the industry) form of business organization leveraging a
breakthrough (to the industry) technology, though one or the other can
fuel business disruption on its own.
But what is the connection, if any, between business disruption
theory and what we call policy disruption? As the contrast between
Uber and Netflix reveals, our main point is that identifying a business
innovation as disruptive or not, according to business theory, does not
settle the question of what to do about it as a policy matter. Two of the
classic case studies of truly disruptive innovation, for example, are the
Swiffer mop, which has essentially replaced the traditional mop in
many residential and commercial settings, and Kleenex tissues, which
were introduced to remove cold cream and eventually displaced the
cloth handkerchief.36 Neither raised a policy battle. But how many other
potential disruptive business innovations have failed because they did
raise policy disruptions? Consider the demise of the digital music file-
sharing site, Napster, which ran head first into copyright law, and the
similar copyright law snarls a later permutation, Redigi, has run into.37
the mainstream lexicon and business leaders from all over the world seek advice from the scholar."
Michael R. Weeks, Is Disruption Theory Wearing New Clothes or Just Naked? Analyzing Recent
Critiques of Disruptive Innovation Theory, 17 INNOVATION 417, 417 (2015).
35. Many of the business theorists' criticisms center on the vagueness and imprecision of the
theory, including how to define disruption, whether the theory has predictive value, how to explain
successes and failures, and how incumbents should respond. Nor is it evident when an innovation
is really disruptive or how to predict its success or failure. Christensen's critics accuse him in this
regard of cherry-picking examples of success to support the theory while ignoring potentially
disruptive technologies that ultimately failed. Indeed, this was the central focus of Harvard history
professor Jill Lepore's withering critique of Christensen in a 2014 article published in The New
Yorker, in which she lambasted Christensen for using handpicked cases, never publishing in a
peer-reviewed journal, and providing little predictive power though his theory. See Jill Lepore, The
Disruption Machine, NEW YORKER, June 23, 2014, at 30, 30-36. Christensen and colleagues
responded in Christensen et al., supra note 13; see also Andrew A. King & Baljir Baatartogtokh,
How Useful Is the Theory of Disruptive Innovation, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV., Fall 2015,
http://sloanreview.mit.edularticle/how-useful-is-the-theory-of-disruptive-innovation/
[https://perma.cc/G6H8-Y6ED] (analyzing and critiquing case studies). For a thorough review of
the debate, see Weeks, supra note 34, passim.
36. Jon M. Garon, Mortgaging the Meme: Financing and Managing Disruptive Innovation, 10
Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 441, 443-45 (2012).
37. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); Capitol Records,
LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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Or consider Aereo, a television streaming service, whose business model
broadcast networks was successfully challenged in the Supreme Court,
and which subsequently filed for bankruptcy.38
Indeed, disruptive innovation theory advocates and critics alike
fail in any meaningful way to incorporate policy either as an
explanation for why a business innovation becomes disruptive in its
relevant industry or, more fundamentally, for when a business
innovation creates policy challenges. We identified no business
scholarship engaging in robust policy analysis to explain and sort
through the contours and merits of how disruptive innovation theory
interacts with policy questions.
Legal scholarship in this space has done little more to bridge the
two domains in any meaningful way. Only a few legal scholars have
attempted to link the platform economy with the business theory of
disruptive innovation.39 More attention in legal scholarship has been
devoted to disruptive innovation theory generally. 40 In both cases,
however, the analysis for the most part moves directly from a discussion
of disruptive innovation theory to suggested policy responses, omitting
the key middle step of examining the policy implications of disruptive
innovation from a theoretical perspective.41 Then there is the
burgeoning body of legal scholarship on the platform economy, which
largely describes the phenomenon as "disruptive" or "innovative"
38. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014); Emily Steel, Aereo Concedes Defeat and
Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/22/
business/aereo-files-for-bankruptcy.html [https://perma.ccZ8K3-6MYT].
39. Sofia Ranchordas, Innovation Experimentalism in the Age of the Sharing Economy, 19
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 871, 883-88 (2016).
40. Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruptive Innovation, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 175 (2014);
Garon, supra note 36; Randolph Kahn, Law's Great Leap Forward: How Law Found a Way to Keep
Pace with Disruptive Technological Change, ABA: Bus. L. TODAY, Nov. 2016,
https://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2016/11/03_kahn.html [https://perma.cc/ZF9A-
F3UQ].
41. For example, while providing the most thoughtful analysis to date of policy design options
for managing disruptive innovation, Cortez moves from discussing the theory and examples of
disruptive innovation directly to outlining a "regulatory toolkit," linking the two with only the
observation that "certain innovations do not square well with existing regulatory frameworks."
Cortez, supra note 40, at 187, 199-226. Similarly, Edelman and Geradin's study of market failures
leading to the platform economy and policy approaches simply observes that "these platforms tend
to be in tension with existing regulatory frameworks." Edelman & Geradin, supra note 21, at 293;
see also JACOB HASSELBALCH, REGULATING DISRUPTIVE INNOVATIONS: THE POLICY DISRUPTION OF
ELECTRONIC CIGARETTES 22-23 (2014) (briefly noting that "regulators are unable to adjust
regulatory dynamics to the new market realities, creating a swiftly growing regulatory deficit or
policy disruption"); K. Sabeel Rahman, The Shape of Things to Come: The On-Demand Economy
and the Normative Stakes of Regulating 21st-Century Capitalism, 7 EUR. J. RISK REG. 652, 652,
655 (2016) (characterizing the platform economy as a "wave of 'disruptive' business models" that
is "difficult from a regulatory perspective").
2017] 1577
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
without connecting that claim to business theory, and moves quickly on
from there to spelling out policy prescriptions. 42
Our aim is not to discount the value of these bodies of business
and legal scholarship but, rather, to fuse them. Our thesis is that doing
so requires a theory of what we call policy disruption. By this we mean
a more disciplined framework for analyzing how different forms of
business innovation present distinct types of policy challenges. In short,
the question that has been omitted from both the business and legal
theory of business innovation, and the platform economy in particular,
is why certain innovations do not square well with existing regulatory
frameworks. This question has come up repeatedly in different contexts
over time. The next Section offers a framework for understanding the
different forms of business innovation and policy disruption that can
occur.
B. What Is Policy Disruption?
So, what determines whether a business innovation, however its
business disruptiveness is defined and measured, leads to a policy
disruption? At the most basic level, the new technology or business
model (or both) driving the innovation must present concerns relevant
to the existing regulatory structure governing the incumbent industry.
In other words, the innovation must not square well with, or must be in
tension with, existing regulatory frameworks. This is the difference
between Uber and Netflix. In the case of Netflix, the rise of a new
competitor to Blockbuster did not pose any significant impacts for the
major regulatory systems governing Blockbuster-local land-use
regulation and intellectual property. Once Netflix assured copyright
holders that its mail delivery model complied with copyright law, which
presented the same legal questions as Blockbuster's business model, a
distinct advantage was that it faced no land-use law concerns. After all,
the whole point of Netflix is that it did not require brick-and-mortar
stores, and therefore it did not raise questions about traffic,
development, noise, or other impacts that would be considered relevant
for land-use regulators. On the other hand, the rise of Uber creates
impacts that are relevant for the regulatory system that covers taxis.
Uber cars use the same city streets as taxis and therefore might
contribute to traffic congestion or emissions; Uber drivers carry
passengers in the same way that taxi drivers do, raising possible
concerns about safety for passengers, other drivers, pedestrians, and
42. See supra note 3.
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bicyclists; Uber claims that its drivers are independent contractors, not
employees, thus raising employment law issues; and so on. Similarly,
Airbnb "hosts" can impose the very impacts that have led to restrictions
on residential rentals found in many zoning regimes and private
covenants, and the same concerns about discrimination in the provision
of short-term rental housing that motivated the passage of the Civil
Rights Act.4 3
But even if the business innovation does raise issues for the
relevant regulatory structures, there is still the question of whether
there is a mismatch between the innovation and the existing regulatory
scheme. Some significant business innovations have not produced
dramatic conflicts with regulatory schemes because they have not
fundamentally altered the way in which the innovator interacts with
the regulatory scheme as compared to incumbent firms. For instance,
the rise of national chain warehouse and big-box retail posed major
challenges for existing independent retail businesses, putting many of
them out of business.44 The business innovation leveraged a vastly
increased scale of operation-bigger stores and more of them, operated
through a centralized network-to increase control of supply chains,
warehousing, employment pools, and other logistics. 4 5 However,
warehouse and big-box retail stores nonetheless fit comfortably within
the standard land-use planning system that most local governments
use: they require a building permit for construction, just like a small
retail store; the development and use of the property by a big-box retail
would be covered by zoning regulations, just like a small retail store;
and enforcement for violations could be imposed against the developer
or owner of the property, just like a small retail store. Of course, the
rise of big-box retail might pose a range of challenges to the substantive
standards that land-use law applies to development. For instance, local
governments began creating special regulatory standards for big-box
retail because of concerns over traffic, sprawl, and impacts on small
retail operations in urban core areas.46 But those standards could easily
43. See Zale, supra note 3, at 993-94.
44. See e.g., David Merriman et al., The Impact of an Urban WalMart Store on Area
Businesses: The Chicago Case, 26 EcON. DEV. Q. 321 (2012).
45. See Emek Basker, The Causes and Consequences of Wal-Mart's Growth, 21 J. ECON.
PERSP. 177 (2007). Alas, a new business model armed with a new technology-online shopping-
has challenged the brick-and-mortar big-box model in many sectors. See Bourree Lam, Why the
Biggest Big-Box Stores Survive, ATLANTIC (May 11, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/
archive/2016/05/big-box-future/482211/ [https://perma.cclTN4Y-L27N].
46. See generally Patricia E. Salkin, Municipal Regulation of Formula Businesses: Creating
and Protecting Communities, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1251 (2008).
2017] 1579
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
be applied to big-box retail stores through the existing land-use
regulatory system. 47
In contrast, compare the disconnect Uber creates between its
claimed innovation and the taxi regulatory systems that exist in many
local jurisdictions. The existing systems generally presume that the
operator of a taxi works (more or less) full-time on the job, owns or has
a long-term contractual relationship to use the relevant vehicle,
primarily uses the vehicle for taxi use rather than personal use, is part
of a larger taxi company that dispatches taxis and can ensure
compliance with a range of regulatory standards, and so forth. In
contrast, an Uber driver might only drive for a few hours a week, can
switch from one platform to another or operate for multiple platforms
simultaneously (e.g., flip to Lyft), uses her personal car for the ride-
sharing work, and may have a fairly tenuous or contingent relationship
with the ride-sharing platform. All of these fundamental differences in
business model make the application of taxi regulations to individual
Uber operators or to the Uber platform itself much more difficult or
even impossible (at least without making Uber driving much less
economically attractive). 48
What can be drawn from these and similar examples to identify
the features distinguishing between business innovation-policy
mismatches and other kinds of policy disruptions? We are not concerned
here, for example, with policy disruptions resulting from changing
social norms, such as acceptance of same-sex marriage, or from general
technological advancements, such as 3-D printing. Rather, the policy
disruptions of interest in our model must involve a business innovation
threatening an incumbent industry in such a way as to create a policy
problem that the existing regulatory regime does not effectively manage.
In other words, the policy problem must stem from a disconnect
between the existing regulatory structure and the business innovation
threatening the incumbent industry firms. Moreover, the relevant
regulatory structure need not be confined to the regime governing the
incumbent industry, as the business innovation might be so novel
47. It is worth noting that local zoning laws often employ individualized permit
determinations by an administrative body, and expressly incorporate provisions for waiver of
default rules. For a discussion of the role of permits as a potentially flexible public policy
instrument to address policy disruption, see infra notes 145--148 and accompanying text.
48. This, of course, is the fundamental issue facing Uber and policymakers: Should existing
taxi regulation regimes apply, in which case Uber will face substantial constraints, or should some
less restrictive regime be designed so as to allow Uber's model some space? See generally Katrina
M. Wyman, Taxi Regulation in the Age of Uber, 20 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (2017) (offering
an analysis of how taxi regulation should change in light of ride-hailing apps).
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compared to industry incumbents that it raises policy concerns that the
incumbents do not.
One can meaningfully identify four distinct species of such policy
disruptions fueled by business innovation. The first category involves
what we call policy End-runs, which occur when the business
innovation, notwithstanding similarities to the incumbent industry,
argues that the features of its technology or business model innovation
make it sufficiently distinct so as to not be subject to costly regulation,
tax, or other instruments of the policy regime governing the incumbent
industry.49 Current examples playing out in the platform economy
include Uber's nearly world-wide battles with jurisdictions over
whether it is subject to the regimes governing taxis, and concerns
regarding whether Airbnb hosts are subject to public and private
restrictions on short-term accommodations rentals.50
In some cases, the End-run may involve very little in the way of
meaningful technological or business model innovation, relying more on
the innovator's bald declaration that the existing legal regime does not
apply to it. Consider Uber versus traditional taxi companies. If a taxi
company one day simply declared: "We are no longer a taxi company.
We will henceforth use an app for dispatching. We have let go our
former driver employees and sold our taxis to them. We will consider
allowing them and anyone else with a car to find passengers with our
app if they pay us a cut of the fare. We will dictate both the fare and our
cut, both of which will vary as we see fit, and will evaluate each driver
to determine whether to allow them to continue using our app. With
these radical innovations in place, we can no longer be regulated as a
taxi company." That would be Uber. Uber's business model
innovations-including its functional renting of vehicles from private
driver-partners on a short-term basis and its convenience for users in
how they "hail" and pay for rides-are facilitated by advances in
smartphone technology. Uber's real distinction, some would argue, is
that the platform is expressly and intentionally challenging the existing
regulatory schemes that protect incumbents, including supply caps
through medallions, fare controls, and other economic regulation in
different jurisdictions-in the name of promoting "free" markets.51
49. Indeed, efforts by businesses to argue that they are not covered by the law, or even to
flout the law, may be part of a calculated business strategy to create facts on the ground that will
force changes in the relevant regulations to enable the business to continue to operate. See Pollman
& Barry, supra note 11.
50. See STONE, supra note 1, at 211-324.
51. Similarly, some commentators defend Airbnb, notwithstanding the fact that many of its
"hosts" are violating leases, private covenants, and public regulations, as facilitating "the
fundamental right to earn income from one's property" and thereby promoting free markets. See
2017] 1581
1582 VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW [Vol. 70:5:1561
A threshold question in an End-run scenario, therefore, is how
truly innovative, whether technologically or through its business model,
the claimed innovation is compared to the incumbent industry. That is
the fight Uber is facing.52 The less similarity between the two, the more
legitimate the claim that the existing regulatory regime does not apply
and the End-run is not merely an evasion strategy. 53 But that does not
end the policy disruption analysis, as the innovation may still present
the same policy concerns as the incumbent industry, perhaps to a
greater or lesser degree, or raise entirely new ones.54 The question
remains whether the existing regulatory regime, or some other form of
regulation, should apply.
The second variety of policy disruption category is what we call
policy Exemptions. Exemptions occur when it is clear that the business
innovation fits an explicit exception in the existing policy regime and is
not subject to the regulation, tax, or other constraint, but it is creating
or exacerbating a condition the policy regime was intended to control or
mitigate. A current example comes from evidence that many Airbnb
Christina Sandefur, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Home-Sharing, REGULATION, Fall 2016, at
12. One business scholar's scathing critique of Uber (and the platform economy in general) builds
on the End-run theme, arguing that platforms used "sharing economy" rhetoric to avoid or
minimize regulation in the start-up stage, grew strong fast, and, when faced eventually with
regulatory pushback, began to fight hard to write the rules that govern them. See Abbey Stemler,
The Myth of the Sharing Economy and Its Implications for Regulating Innovation, EMORY L.J.
(forthcoming 2017) http://ssrn.com/abstract=2828308 [https://perma.cc/PH76-GCJ7]. Indeed, as
local jurisdictions in Tennessee began enforcing existing room-rental regulations against Airbnb,
HomeAway, and similar platforms, and in some cases relaxing existing regulations but not
eliminating them entirely, Airbnb succeeded in lobbying to have a bill introduced in the state
legislature to preempt such local regulations, on the ground of promoting a free market approach.
See Joey Garrison, Bill Would Block Renting Ban, TENNESSEAN, Feb. 10, 2017, at 3A.
52. Two business consultants have argued that platform economy firms like Uber and Airbnb
are not sufficiently dissimilar from the incumbent firms, which had already been moving in the
direction of using similar technology and business models, to justify different regulatory
treatment. Robert Haslehurst & Alan Lewis, We Don't Need a Whole New Regulatory Regime for
Platforms Like Uber and Airbnb, HARV. Bus. REV., Apr. 4, 2016, https:/fhbr.org/2016/04/we-dont-
need-a-whole-new-regulatory-regime-for-platforms-like-uber-and-airbnb [https://perma.cc/YM7F-
6JW6]. Following outcry from community advocates and the hotel industry, the legislation died.
53. Speaking of evasion, in 2017 it was revealed that Uber had for several years been using
a tool known as Greyball to engage in a worldwide "violation of terms of service" program that
included evading authorities by sending phantom rides to persons hailing a ride who were known
by Uber to be local regulatory authorities. See Mike Isaac, How Uber Deceives the Authorities
Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2017), https://nyti.ms/21nl5b8 [https://perma.cc/67D3-JTGCJ.
54. For example, taxis compete with public transit and thus could undermine transit policy,
but local taxi regulation authorities can control the number and fees of taxis to strike a balance.
There is growing concern that Uber and its competitors have upset the balance in some cities by
releasing an uncontrolled number of variable-pricing rides for hire onto the streets. See Light,
Precautionary Federalism, supra note 7, at 367-70 (noting dearth of empirical research on the
interaction between U~berfLyft and public transportation); Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Subway
Ridership Declines in New York. Is Uber to Blame?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2017),
https://nyti.ms/2lBpZOB [https://perma.cclPBL3-NLRK].
REGULATING BUSINESS INNOVATION
"hosts" engage in discriminatory "guest" selection practices.5 5 Such
practices would be illegal under federal housing laws but for specific
exemptions covering rentals by homeowners that fit the Airbnb model
in many cases. Renting out a room or unit in a dwelling where one
continues to live and renting a home one owns are, under certain
conditions, exempt from antidiscrimination rules under the Fair
Housing Act. 5 6 The exemptions, regarded as a compromise critical to
passing the housing discrimination laws, were intentional and likely
regarded as small scale in use and impact during the era of homeowners
finding renters through newspaper classified ads. Airbnb has both
scaled up the homeowner room rental market to vast proportions 5 7 and
made overt discrimination as easy and impersonal as a smartphone
swipe to the left. Yet evidence of rampant discrimination does not
change its legal status under the existing regime. Exemptions thus raise
the question of whether to revisit the scope and terms of the regulatory
exemption or address the problem through other regulatory strategies
(e.g., strictly enforce zoning and other restrictions against rentals or
impose liability on Airbnb as the platform).
Distinct from End-runs and Exemptions, policy Gaps occur when
the business innovation threatening incumbent businesses creates a
new policy problem for which no policy regime exists or for which
applying an existing regime would require a novel and tenuous
application of the regime's statutory and regulatory authorities. An
example is the rise of internet advertising targeted by algorithms
tracking a user's search habits.5 8 The rapid spread of such innovative
advertising methods has unquestionably disrupted the advertising
industry, thrusting firms like Google and Amazon into its forefront. Yet
there is no existing advertising regulatory regime that Google and
55. See Edelman et al., supra note 12; Zale, supra note 3, at 992-93; see also Selden v. Airbnb,
Inc., No. 1:16-cv-00933, 2016 WL 6476934 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2016) (order dismissing class action
lawsuit against Airbnb alleging discrimination, on ground that Airbnb "guests" agree to
arbitration when using the platform).
56. Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (2012) (providing exemptions from the
prohibition of discrimination in the sale and leasing of dwellings); see also Fair Hous. Council v.
Roommate.com, LLC, 666 F.3d 1216 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that a bedroom in a home is not a
"dwelling" and thus the FHA does not apply to advertisements for leasing the bedroom that
discriminate based on protected classes).
57. Kellen Zale has argued that scale-the aggregate effect of many small transactions in the
space-is the platform economy's "defining feature and fundamental challenge," observing that
"small may be beautiful, but when everything is small, the regulatory challenge is immense." Zale,
supra note 3, at 950.
58. See Alistair Barr & Jennifer Saba, Amazon Finally Gets Serious About Ads, on Track to





Amazon could be accused of evading and no explicit exemption in any
such regime into which they fit. Put simply, the practice does not exist
as far as advertising regulation goes, and no other existing regime
specifically contemplates it, yet the innovation raises profound policy
questions regarding privacy and data security.59 Gaps thus raise the
question of whether to create a new regulatory regime or extend an
existing one to manage the new policy concerns.
End-runs, Exemptions, and Gaps share in common the attribute
of presenting cases of potential regulatory underinclusion. In each
scenario, the policy disruption arises because the innovation is arguably
or clearly subject to less restrictive regulation than the incumbent
industry. But the orientation of the problem differs given the distinct
aspect of each type of policy disruption. End-runs require regulators to
decide whether to argue that the existing regime actually does apply to
the business innovation, whereas Exemptions require regulators to
decide whether amend the law to remove the exemption into which the
innovation fits. Gaps require regulators to decide whether to create a
new regime, or a wholly new interpretation of an existing regime, to
protect the public from the business innovation. All three of these policy
disruption scenarios require policymakers to decide whether to
eliminate some or all of the regulatory differential between the
innovation and the incumbent industry. How to accomplish the "fix"
differs not only technically, but also likely in terms of the political and
administrative dynamics.
By contrast, our fourth category of policy disruption, which we
call Solutions, involves potential regulatory overinclusion. Solutions
arise when the business innovation, which is arguably or clearly
covered by existing regulations, solves a problem that led to regulation
of the incumbent industry in the first place or presents superior public
welfare outcomes looking forward compared to the incumbent industry
operating under the regulatory status quo. 60 The innovation, in other
59. See Kate Kaye, Cross-Device Tracking Creates New Level of Privacy Concerns, FTC Says,
ADVERTISINGAGE (Nov. 16, 2015), http://adage.com/article/datadriven-marketing/cross-device-
tracking-creates-new-privacy-concerns-ftc/301383/ [https://perma.cc/7QKG-8TT8]. See generally




60. Solutions differ from End-runs in that the business innovation that provides a Solution
often is clearly covered by the existing regulatory regime, and the business innovation at least
purports to solve an important public policy problem that is the basis for the existing regulatory
system. On the other hand, an End-run is arguably not covered by the existing regulatory regime,
and does not necessarily purport to solve an existing public policy problem. There may be
substantial overlap between the two, or a business innovation might be classified within either of
the two categories. For instance, if ride-sharing platforms such as Uber are understood to solve
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words, is superior to the incumbent industry model in terms of a harm
the existing legal regime was designed to manage or will likely have to
manage in the future. The rise of distributed renewable energy, for
example, threatens the conventional power generation and distribution
industries but presents distinct advantages for consumer choice and
climate change mitigation policies.61 Likewise, Tesla's electric vehicles
can address some of the climate consequences of fossil fuel-powered
vehicles that current regulations address. Maintaining the regulatory
status quo in cases of Solutions could overregulate the innovation and
impede its penetration into the industry. Solutions thus may lead to
new regulations covering the innovation or to revising the existing
regulations covering the incumbent industry. Some jurisdictions, for
example, now require utilities to purchase excess power generated from
residential solar panels.62
As Table 1 below summarizes, these four kinds of policy
disruptions capture essentially all of the underlying policy concerns
involved in the legal and political battles plaguing the platform
economy (Is Uber just a blatant End-run around taxi regulation?
Should Airbnb hosts be punished for discriminating by closing an
Exemption?). Importantly, they are not mutually exclusive for any new
business innovation, and they present distinct policy problems and
legal questions. For example, Airbnb has created an Exemption
disruption through hosts legally discriminating and a set of End-run
disruptions involving zoning, hotel tax, and other regulatory regimes.
Deciding what to do about one form of policy disruption does not
necessarily dictate what to do about the other. In addition, some
business innovations may be alternatively classified as fitting within
multiple categories, depending on differing understandings of the
relevant legal systems and how the models relate to existing public
policy problems.63
important public policy problems and to be clearly covered by existing taxi regulations, then they
are Solutions. However, if they are instead understood as purely efforts to provide profits to drivers
and/or the platform owners, and are also understood as not covered by the existing regulatory
system, then they would be End-runs. As a result, Uber will portray its business model as a
Solution while taxi companies portray it as an End-run. Moreover, as a practical matter some
business models cannot be implemented as End-runs because enforcement by the current
regulatory system is simply too effective-for instance, a homeowner seeking to connect their
distributed solar generation system to the grid has to get approval from the grid operator, and
thus an End-run will not be effective.
61. See infra Section II.A.
62. See infra note 83.
63. See supra note 60.
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TABLE 1: THE TYPOLOGY OF POLICY DISRUPTIONS CAUSED BY BUSINESS
INNOVATION
Policy Conditions Policy Mismatch Legal Questions
Disruption
The innovator The innovator How plausible is it
End-run challenges presents many of that the existing
application of the the same social regulatory regime
existing regulatory harms that led to does not apply? If it
regime by pointing regulation of the is plausible that it
to business model incumbent does apply, how
distinctions industry, should regulators
between it and react?
____________incumbent firms. __________
The innovator The scale of the Should the
Exemption clearly fits an innovator's use of Exemption be closed,
Exemption, waiver, the Exemption and if so, how? How
or other form of presents social would the actions
relief from the harms not and actors originally
existing regulatory anticipated when deemed eligible for
regime not the exemption was the relief be
available to included in the differentiated?
incumbent firms. existing regulatory Should they be?
regime.
The innovator Neither the effects Is a new regulatory
Gap threatens on the incumbent regime needed? How
incumbent firms firms nor the would it be
but no existing possible social designed? Would it
regulatory regime harms of the be engrafted onto
covers its unregulated the existing
technology or innovator activity regulatory regime or
business model, are being a separate
managed. reulato action?
The innovator faces The existing Should the regime
Solution barriers under the regulatory regime be reformed to
existing regulatory is impeding a regulate incumbent
regime but presents business model or firms more
superior social technology leading aggressively, or to
welfare outcomes to superior social open the way to the
compared to welfare outcomes, innovation, and if so,
incumbent firms. show?
As we show below, the framework also extends well beyond the
platform economy. Business innovations with meaningful impacts on a
wide range of incumbent industries will generally present challenges of
End-runs, Exemptions, Gaps, and Solutions, and this has long been the
case. Put simply, this is not the first time the business world has seen
a phenomenon like Uber, nor the first (or last) time the policy world
will, either. This is a fundamental point, and Part 11 demonstrates this
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with two case studies unrelated to the platform economy-electricity
generation and franchising-to highlight how challenges that
regulators have faced in the past can inform how regulators should
respond to such challenges in the present and the future.
II. THE PAST AND FUTURE OF BUSINESS INNOVATION AND POLICY
DISRUPTION
The rise of new business models that create mismatches with
regulatory structures is not a new problem. Indeed, it is one that has
recurred repeatedly over time. Even more important, this problem will
recur in the future because incumbent business models will continue to
adapt themselves to the relevant regulatory structures, and vice versa.
As a result, regulatory structures will be susceptible to significant
disruption when the (inevitable) new business model emerges.
To ground these points and make clear that concerns regarding
business disruption go well beyond the platform economy, we present
below two case studies of electricity and franchising innovation and
regulation. Both sectors present rich histories of business innovations
challenging existing regulatory frameworks, as well as the ways in
which regulatory frameworks respond. They also both demonstrate the
endogenous nature of the interaction between regulatory systems and
adaptive business models. Because we have offered Uber and Airbnb as
classic cases of End-runs and Exemptions, here we offer examples of a
Solution and a Gap.
A. Electricity
The history of the electricity industry provides ample evidence of
how business models have come and gone over time, intersecting with
regulatory systems that likewise have arisen and been displaced. This
history also shows how regulatory structures and business models can
mutually reinforce each other-the business model can be the basis for
a new regulatory structure and in turn can be reinforced and shaped by
that regulatory structure. Yet, even as the business model and
regulatory structure reinforce each other, even the most apparently
stable systems of business models and interlocking regulatory
structures eventually become subject to stress and strain as a result of
technological and economic changes.
In the early days of the electricity industry, around the turn of
the twentieth century, the industry was either unregulated or, if it was
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regulated at all, it was regulated at the municipal level. 6 4
Municipalities had regulatory authority because electric companies had
to use public streets and rights-of-way to string their distribution wires.
Municipalities generally granted nonexclusive franchises to multiple
companies to generate electricity. Some of these municipal decisions to
issue franchises were tainted by corruption. Some municipalities also
entered into the electricity business themselves, taking over electricity
production, distribution, and retailing. Initially, therefore, the
electricity industry was highly localized, with lots of competition among
different utility providers within an individual city. Technology limited
the ability of electricity generators to distribute electricity across long
distances. The result of the frequent competition, and easy entry
because of liberal grants of nonexclusive franchises by municipalities,
was a lot of bankruptcies and consolidation in the electricity industry.
However, technological changes soon altered the dynamic
substantially, creating a very different dominant business model. The
invention of alternating current power and large-scale generators
allowed for the creation of large, centralized utilities. Samuel Insull,
who took over the Chicago Edison Company, was a pioneer in
developing and installing these new generation and distribution
technologies. He combined the technological innovation with aggressive
takeovers of competing providers in the Chicago area and effectively
created a monopoly over electricity production in the city. Other cities
soon followed suit.
The rise of the consolidated, large-scale electricity corporation
led to pressure for a public response by revising the relevant regulatory
structures. This pressure coincided with the dominance of the
Progressive movement at the local and state level in many parts of the
United States. A key component of this movement's ideology was the
replacement of corrupt political machines with expert, nonpartisan
administration. Regulation of large corporations providing essential
services, such as railroads and grain elevators, was part of that
movement and extended to support for municipal ownership of
electricity systems.
64. The history that follows is drawn from RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER LOSs: THE ORIGINS OF
DEREGULATION AND RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM 13-14 (1999);
William J. Hausman & John L. Neufeld, The Market for Capital and the Origins of State
Regulation ofElectric Utilities in the United States, 62 J. ECON. HIST. 1050, 1054-56 (2002); George
L. Priest, The Origins of Utility Regulation and the "Theories of Regulation" Debate, 36 J.L. &
ECON. 289, 301-06 (1993).
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The electricity industry, faced with the possibility of municipal
takeovers, chose regulation as the better alternative. 65 Indeed, there
were strong benefits for the electricity industry from regulation. In
return for regulation of rates by government agencies and a promise by
utilities to provide nondiscriminatory, universal service (or close to
universal service) to all customers who could pay, the utilities received
exclusive rights to generate, distribute, and sell electricity-a
guaranteed legal monopoly.66 The relevant statutes were broad,
requiring that the state regulator ensure that utility rates were "just,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory." 67
This regulatory bargain was justified on the grounds that there
were increasing returns to scale in the electricity industry, such that it
was a natural monopoly.68 Because larger entities would have lower
costs as a result of economies of scale, smaller entities would either be
absorbed or driven out of business, and entry by new providers would
be extremely difficult. Accordingly, excluding new entrants legally
would have minimal long-run economic impacts, and instead the
problem to be solved was to eliminate the potential for abuse of
monopoly position. In exchange for the monopoly position of the
incumbent provider, rates were set to ensure that utilities would make
a minimum level of return on their investments in their facilities.69
This regulatory system, which was fully developed in all states
by the 1920s, established the basic structure of the electricity industry
in the United States for the next fifty years. It encouraged the
65. HIRSH, supra note 64, at 23-24, 27-28; see also id. at 30 (noting how Insull encouraged
fellow industry leaders to endorse state regulation); William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-
Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1614, 1642 (2014); Hausman & Neufeld, supra note 64, at 1058-
61; Jim Rossi, Public Choice, Energy Regulation and Deregulation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 419, 420 (Daniel A Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell eds., 2010)
(noting that the National Electric Light Association "played a key role in proposing and lobbying
for state regulation of electric utilities throughout the United States" and "viewed municipal
ownership of utilities as the main alternative to price regulation, but opposed public ownership").
66. HIRSH, supra note 64, at 26-28; see also Jim Rossi, The Common Law 'Duty to Serve" and
Protection of Consumers in an Age of Competitive Retail Public Utility Restructuring, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 1233, 1248-60, 1263-66 (1998) (describing the legal connection between utility regulation,
exclusive monopoly, and universal service requirements); Rossi, supra note 65, at 423. Utilities
were also often given eminent domain power to obtain land for facilities or distribution networks.
HIRSH, supra note 64, passim.
67. Boyd, supra note 65, at 1640.
68. HIRSH, supra note 64, passim; Boyd, supra note 65, at 1638-39.
69. See Rossi, supra note 66, at 1268 (noting the need for "price regulation to control monopoly
abuses"). Also, because of the monopoly status of the electricity utility, a duty to serve all customers
was an important regulatory mandate, since customers would have no choice as to which company
would provide them with electricity service. Id. at 1269. The first Wisconsin law set rates based
on capital investments "actually used and useful," in order to prevent utilities from simply
investing in unnecessary facilities in order to receive guaranteed returns on their investments.
HIRSH, supra note 64, at 22.
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development of vertically integrated investor-owned utilities ("IOUs").
By discouraging entry and guaranteeing investments, it made IOUs
extremely appealing investments for investors; and through the
regulatory review and approval process, it locked in an economic and
technical model of centralized generation and large-scale distribution
systems. IOUs benefitted greatly from this regulatory system until the
1970s, particularly as technological advances made large-scale
generation of electricity from fossil fuels cheaper and cheaper.
Thus, while the regulatory system was justified on the grounds
that electricity generation, distribution, and sales were a "natural
monopoly," it is perhaps an unanswerable question whether, if the
regulatory system had been structured somewhat differently, the
electricity industry in the United States might have developed
differently. If the regulatory system had not been designed around
setting guaranteed rates of return for large, vertically integrated IOUs
and restricting competitive entry (even for areas such as generation), it
is possible that alternative economic and technological forms might
have developed that challenged this model.
Between the 1920s and the 1970s, the industry's "grow and
build" strategy resulted in more and more generation capacity using
larger and larger power plants, in part because larger facilities and
technological innovation meant that the unit cost of electricity fell. 70
The falling costs of electricity and increased supply drove dramatic
increases in consumer demand for electricity in the same timeframe. At
times, utilities would even charge consumers who used more electricity
less.
In the 1960s and 1970s, this system began to break down.
Technological improvements had reached a limit in terms of increasing
the size and reducing the costs of large-scale fossil fuel-burning units.
The massive increases in the costs of fuel due to the energy crisis put
further pressure on IOUs. As a result, increased growth in capacity no
longer automatically translated into increased profits. In addition,
consumers began responding to increased costs with changes in
consumption that reduced consumption growth rates for the first time.71
One of the congressional responses to the energy crisis in the
1970s was the enactment of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act
70. HIRSH, supra note 64, at 46-50. The guaranteed rate of return on investments might have
created an incentive for utilities to overinvest in capital plant facilities. Rossi, supra note 65, at
427 (describing the "Averch-Johnson effect" identified by economists in which guaranteed returns
on capital investments for regulated utilities might produce overinvestment, but noting limited
empirical support for this effect).
71. HIRSH, supra note 64, at 59-63; Rossi, supra note 65, at 427.
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("PURPA") in 1979.72 Section 210 of PURPA required state regulators
to allow entry by independent power producers into electricity
generation. Even more significantly, it set standards for the tariffs that
the IOUs would pay to these independent power producers-tariffs that
in many states made electricity generation an appealing prospect for
new industry entrants. IOUs had to purchase power from these
producers at the set tariffs, ending their decades-long monopoly.73
PURPA spurred innovation in the development of small-scale,
low-cost generation facilities, including some renewable and some
combined-cycle natural gas plants that could operate at relatively low
costs. 7 4 This represented a sharp contrast with the earlier reliance on
large-scale central generation facilities.75 This rise of independent
generation under PURPA undermined arguments that electricity
generation was a natural monopoly that required exclusive service by a
vertically integrated IOU 7 6 -a classic potential business disruption.
Power generation from gas turbines operated by independent
power producers began to be substantially cheaper than that provided
by the IOUs, especially as IOUs continued to bear the burden of
substantial costs invested in failed or extremely costly nuclear facilities
in the 1970s and the costs of encouraging energy conservation.77 Large
industrial users saw low costs from independent generators and wanted
to avoid having to pay higher rates from integrated utilities.78 They
began pushing for deregulation of electricity sales as well as generation
in the 1980s and 1990s, with academic and political allies.79 These users
72. HIRSH, supra note 64, ch. 4.
73. Id. at 81-88.
74. Id. at 114-17.
75. Id. at 52.
76. Id. at 119, 123-24; Rossi, supra note 66, at 1277-78.
77. HIRSH, supra note 64, at 235-38, 247-48.
78. Id. at 235-39, 247-48; Rossi, supra note 65, at 434-35 (noting that wide variation in
electricity generation costs across states and across different generation facilities created a strong
incentive for large users to seek to purchase directly from low cost generators).
79. HIRSH, supra note 64, chs. 13-14; Rossi, supra note 66, at 1275 ("[T]he introduction of
competition to the electric utility industry has been motivated in large part by large consumer
interests, particularly the interests of high-load industrial customers . . . ."); Rossi, supra note 65,
at 435 ("Together, new entrants without service obligations (such as independent power plants
and merchant facilities), large industrial customers demanding lower cost power, and utilities
possessing excess transmission capacity forged an informal alliance favoring reforms to the
industry."). For an overview of the academic critiques, see Boyd, supra note 65, at 1651-58. For a
seminal article critiquing the natural monopoly justification for electric utility regulation, see
Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & EcON. 55 (1968) (arguing that the risk of entry
into electricity or other supposed natural monopolies can reduce or eliminate the ability of the
incumbent provider to charge monopoly prices even if there is no actual competition); see also




argued that generation was not, in fact, a natural monopoly and so
there was no need to prohibit entry by new generators.
As a result, Congress authorized the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission ("FERC") in 1992 to open wholesale electricity
transmission to competition,80 an invitation the Commission accepted.81
Many states (especially Texas) began moving towards deregulating
retail electricity transactions and opening up competition at the retail
level. 8 2 Potential business disruption became reality largely because of
this regulatory opening. To put this in the context of our taxonomy,
independent generation was arguably a Solution, because it could
increase generation capacity-and therefore the reliable provision of
electricity that was the goal of the original regulatory system-but was
potentially blocked by existing, overinclusive legal rules. In response,
both Congress and state legislatures responded by creating new legal
rules to permit this business innovation to enter the regulated market.
Electricity deregulation raised difficult transition questions-
particularly how to compensate utilities for "stranded assets" in
generation, transmission, or distribution infrastructure. These assets
were no longer cost competitive, but had been the object of substantial
investment by utilities under the prior rate-based regulatory regime
when rates of return on those investments were supposed to be
guaranteed. This presented a difficult question: If consumers could
abandon the IOUs and their stranded assets, who should pay for
them? 8 3 Questions of stranded assets and affected reliance interests are
thus not unique to the rise of the platform economy.
Since 2010, a major challenge for the traditional utility business
model has been the rise of distributed generation, in particular the
growth of rooftop solar electricity production on residential and
commercial buildings.84 Like independent generation before it,
80. See Energy Policy Act of 1992 §§ 721-22, 16 U.S.C. § 824 (1994).
81. This is the famous FERC Order No. 888. See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through
Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540
(May 10, 1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35-385).
82. HIRSH, supra note 64, ch. 14; Rossi, supra note 66, at 1282.
83. For a sample of the discussion at the time, see, e.g., James Boyd, The "Regulatory
Compact" and Implicit Contracts: Should Stranded Costs be Recoverable?, 19 ENERGY J. 69, 69
(1998). Some scholars argued that there had been an implicit regulatory contract between utilities
and the government in which utilities could expect to receive reasonable returns on approved
investments, and failure to allow those investments to continue to receive returns after
deregulation would constitute an unconstitutional taking or a breach of contract for which
compensation is owed. See id. (summarizing these arguments).
84. Boyd, supra note 65, at 1675 ("Today, the biggest threats [to the traditional business
utility model] are coming from the customer side in the form of increased demand response,
efficiency, and distributed generation . .. which are reducing load for utilities .... ). Distributed
generation can be defined as a "small customer-owned generator[] .... sited at or near the locations
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distributed solar generation is creating a set of similar policy
disruptions. While distributed generation represents about one percent
of installed generation in the United States, the expected trend is for
substantial and ongoing growth, particularly through solar photovoltaic
("PV") roof panels.85 Distributed generators can substantially reduce
the amount of electricity they take from the grid; moreover, with
subsidies such as net metering, they can be paid at higher retail rates
for the electricity they sell back to the grid, as compared to large-scale
generators that are paid at wholesale rates. 86 The result is that
distributed generators can substantially reduce the income utilities
receive and reduce electricity consumption.87
Both of these changes are potentially threatening to utilities and
many of their customers for two reasons. First, many of the fixed costs
of maintaining the transmission and distribution grid are currently
covered by usage charges for customers. If customers use less
electricity, or there are fewer customers, then those fixed costs must be
spread across fewer units of electricity or fewer customers, raising costs
for those customers who remain to purchase power from traditional
providers.88 Second, the utility rate-setting structure generally involves
substantial cross subsidization by one set of users for another. For
instance, higher-income users often subsidize lower-income users-
either with programs that directly reduce costs based on the income of
the consumer or through rates that impose minimal costs for consumers
who use very little electricity. 89 However, if distributed generators start
where the electricity is used." Sharon B. Jacobs, The Energy Prosumer, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 519, 528-
29 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting CONG. BUDGET OFF., PROSPECTS FOR
DISTRIBUTED ELECTRICITY GENERATION 1 (2003)). For discussion of the potential threat that
distributed generation poses to incumbent utilities, see NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB.,
NREL/TP-6A20-60613, REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE EXPANDED
ADOPTION OF DISTRIBUTED SOLAR (2013) [hereinafter NREL Report]; Fereidoon P. Sioshansi, Why
the Time Has Arrived to Rethink the Electric Business Model, ELECTRICITY J., Aug./Sept. 2012, at
65 (also noting that declining consumer demand and increasing energy efficiency may threaten
industry business models); The Economics of Grid Defection, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST. (2014),
https://www.rmi.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/RMIGridDefectionFull2014-05-1-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AR4K-QDF4] [hereinafter Grid Defection].
85. Jacobs, supra note 84; see also NREL Report, supra note 84, at 3-5 (describing growth
rates and decreased costs for solar distributed generation).
86. NREL Report, supra note 84, at 29-30 (noting that federal law encourages state public
utilities commissions to require utilities to provide net metering and interconnection to all
distributed generators, and that most states have some form of net metering policy).
87. Boyd, supra note 65, at 1676.
88. See NREL Report, supra note 84, at v, 1.
89. One form of cross subsidization is a regulatory requirement that prohibits or restricts the
ability of an electric utility to cut off service to nonpaying (often low-income) customers. This
essentially results in higher-income customers subsidizing service to these customers. Rossi, supra
note 66, at 1272-73 (also noting that there can be cost efficiency benefits in not cutting off service
2017] 1593
1594 VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW [Vol. 70:5:1561
using less and less power from the grid, and pay less for the electricity
that they do use, 90 that dynamic reduces the ability of rates to support
cross subsidization-especially if distributed generators are
disproportionately wealthier consumers. 91 The remaining users will
then be stuck paying more and more for the fixed costs of transmission
and distribution. This generates concerns about distributional fairness
and creates incentives for these remaining users to move to distributed
generation. 92 In addition, if energy storage becomes affordable and
broadly available for distributed generators, that might allow
consumers to completely drop service from the electricity utility-
further exacerbating the increase in the burden of fixed costs and cross
subsidization for the remaining customers.93
The disruptive potential-in the business theory sense-of
distributed generation for traditional utilities has been substantially
increased by the rise of firms acting as "middlemen" that facilitate the
financing and installation of distributed generation by residential and
by allowing the utility to spread fixed costs across a larger number of customers); Rossi, supra note
65, at 424 (same).
90. See Jacobs, supra note 84, at 540-45 (noting that distributed generation, taking into
account tax credits and other subsidies, can allow some consumers to dramatically reduce the cost
of electricity).
91. NREL Report, supra note 84, at 32 ("Because installing distributed PV can entail large
upfront costs or financing, the concern is that wealthier customers may be more likely to be able
to afford this switch in electricity provision.") (also noting that third-party-owned distributed
generation programs, discussed below, can allow lower-income consumers to install distributed
generation); id. ("[Tihe concern is that if the reliance on cost recovery via traditional volumetric
rates goes unchanged, the customers who can most afford to pay for energy could choose to install
distributed PV and see their costs go down, while those who can least afford to pay for energy will
see their costs go up.").
92. See Jacobs, supra note 84, at 540-42 (noting this dynamic); see also Boyd, supra note 65,
at 1676 (same). Another factor is, to the extent that subsidies for solar users are borne by utility
ratepayers in general, this can increase the cross subsidization of distributed generators, again
potentially at the expense of other utility ratepayers, further increasing the incentives for other
utility ratepayers to adopt distributed generation. See Jacobs, supra note 84, for an overview of
the issue. At the extreme, the defection of utility customers to distributed generation might
produce a "death spiral" as utility rates for the remaining customers continue to increase to cover
fixed costs and distributed generation subsidies, pushing even more customers to defect. NREL
Report, supra note 84, at 5-6; Boyd, supra note 65, at 1617, 1676 (noting these arguments).
However, it seems unlikely that any such death spiral is imminent for any utilities in the United
States. See Jacobs, supra note 84, at 541-42. In addition, distributed generation may reduce
certain costs for utilities. NREL Report, supra note 84, at 8-12. The risk of customer defection was
also at issue in retail electricity deregulation in the late 1990s-retail customers might abandon
the incumbent IOU that is saddled with higher costs for stranded assets or for managing the
transmission and distribution grid, increasing the fixed costs for the remaining incumbent
customers, who would have a greater incentive to defect. Rossi, supra note 66, at 1289-90 (noting
this risk).
93. See Grid Defection, supra note 84 (arguing that between solar power and battery energy
storage, it will soon be economically feasible for consumers in many parts of the United States to
terminate standard electric utility service); Jacobs, supra note 84.
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commercial consumers. 94 One version of such firms includes solar
services providers who own the solar panels that they install and run
on a customer's property--companies such as Solar City and Sungevity.
This business model allows for consumers to install solar panels with
low or no initial payments, and long-term regular payments to the solar
service provider in return for regular production and supply of
electricity.95 A second business model is simply the solo homeowner who
decides to install solar panels, bearing all the costs but reaping all of
the cost savings as well.
The history of the electricity industry and the regulatory
structure that shaped it is a clear example of how regulatory structures
and business models are mutually endogenous-how each shapes the
other. Municipal or even state electricity utilities were a plausible
option for the development of the electricity industry even after the rise
of the Insull model of centralized generation and transmission
described earlier. 96 Indeed, they remain an important component of the
electricity industry in a number of major cities. The rise of the Insull
model revealed a Gap in the prior regulatory structure, which assumed
multiple competitive entities for electricity provision, not a presumed
natural monopoly. Instead of embracing municipal ownership, however,
almost all states chose a model of a vertically integrated, investor-
owned utility industry that was heavily regulated. That regulatory
structure in turn shaped the investment, research, and management
decisions of the industry, further cementing that particular business
structure. Explicit barriers to entry, plus regulatory structures that
were designed to interface with large vertically integrated utilities,
effectively excluded most alternative business models.
Over time this dominant business model and its associated
regulatory structure came under strain with technological changes (the
limits of the traditional steam turbine and the rise of small generators),
changes in consumer preferences (a decline in the growth of electricity
consumption), and the rise of environmental concerns about fossil fuels.
The rise of independent generation was arguably a Solution. It solved a
94. NREL Report, supra note 84, at 2, 18-20; Boyd, supra note 65, at 1675-76.
95. In an arrangement in which the middleman company owns the generation equipment,
the consumer has a power purchase agreement with the middleman company. A related
arrangement is a solar lease, in which the consumer rents the equipment over an extended period
of time from the company-again eliminating or reducing the need for large up-front payments.
See NREL Report, supra note 84, at 18-19; Jacobs, supra note 84, at 526 n.19. For an analysis
showing how important third-party ownership has been in expanding distributed solar generation
in southern California, see Easan Drury et al., The Transformation of Southern California's
Residential Photovoltaics Market Through Third-party Ownership, 42 ENERGY POL'Y 681 (2012).
96. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
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problem that the original regulatory regime was designed to address-
independent power generations made electricity cheaper and more
widespread. But this business innovation created a policy disruption
because it was incompatible with existing legal rules. Congress, by
adopting PURPA, solved the policy disruption problem by adopting new
legal rules, and creating an exception to the prior generation monopoly
that allowed the rise of low-cost, smaller-scale, independent power
producers. These regulatory changes in turn prompted technological
innovations in low-cost, small-scale power production and business
innovations in independent power production. These technological
innovations thus drove the rise of electricity deregulation and the
separation of generation, transmission, and distribution businesses.
Now the combination of deregulation, technological innovation
(the rise of low-cost PV solar), and business innovation (third-party
financing of distributed generation) is challenging basic assumptions
about the industry structure that are at the heart of the current
regulatory system.97 For instance, regulatory restrictions on entry into
electricity sales have prevented the deployment of third-party-owned
distributed generation (the Solar City/Sungevity model) in Florida-
which may substantially interfere with the growth of distributed
generation.98 However, other jurisdictions have allowed the rise of
third-party-owned distributed generation, concluding that their
regulatory structure does not cover that business model. 99 Thus,
distributed generation presents an example of a Solution, where the
existing regulatory system may preclude an innovative business
strategy that solves an important policy problem.
B. Franchising
The history of franchising offers a second example of how
business innovation can lead to policy disruption. Franchising is a
business relationship in which a company (the franchisor) provides the
right to an independent agent (franchisee) to distribute its products or
use its trade name and processes. The franchisee must pay for these
rights, and the contract between franchisor and franchisee sets out the
terms of the relationship. Unlike in a vertically integrated firm, where
97. Posner, supra note 79, at 612 (noting that legal limitations on entry "may perpetuate
monopoly long after a market has ceased to be naturally monopolistic"); id. at 636 (arguing that
"natural monopoly conditions are quite likely to be transient").
98. See PW Ventures, Inc. v. Nichols, 533 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1988) (requiring a certificate of
convenience and necessity from the state public utility commission for any electricity generation
for retail sale, no matter how small).
99. See SZ Enters. LLC v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 850 N.W.2d 441 (Iowa 2014).
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the producer owns the distribution channels, franchising relationships
permit the franchisor and franchisees, who are often small business
owners, to work together in a contractual relationship. McDonald's,
Ford car dealerships, and Krispy Kreme Donuts are examples of classic
franchises.
Franchising has produced two disruptive business models:
product franchising and business-format franchising. 100 Product
franchising arose in the middle of the nineteenth century out of the need
for manufacturers to establish retail networks for their goods. This was
particularly true for valuable and complex goods like farm equipment.
Previously, manufacturers of relatively simple, handcrafted goods sold
them to wholesalers, who distributed them to retailers, who in turn sold
a wide range of goods. Wholesale goods suppliers had neither the
expertise nor the capacity to showcase or repair these products for retail
customers, so manufacturers increasingly came to rely on specialized
independent agents to serve as retailers/dealers. As these independent
agents' businesses grew, however, manufacturers sought new forms of
business relationships that would reduce the growing expenses of
distributing large orders of individual products to scores of individual
retailers/dealers. Moreover, the high levels of investment in expensive
equipment drove retailers towards exclusive relationships with
individual manufacturers. Product franchises emerged as a structure
that would both provide low-cost relationships with specialized
independent retailers and ensure a unified system of distribution.
To take one example of product franchising, in the early 1900s
the innovative carmaker, Ford, quickly established a unified system of
distribution to sell its surging production of automobiles roughly
contemporaneously with its development of mass production
techniques. While it wanted to control the dealers that sold and
repaired its cars, Ford was equally worried about the possibility that it
might be held liable for dealer actions. A franchise relationship allowed
Ford to work closely with its dealers while remaining legally
independent; it also avoided the large expenses of Ford creating its own
dealer systems. Over time, however, it became clear that there was a
serious imbalance of power. Ford routinely made demands beyond the
contractual terms and would then threaten to terminate dealer
relationships within ninety days unless the dealers acquiesced. The
primary legal remedies available for franchisees were under contract
100. This section is based on THOMAS S. DICKE, FRANCHISING IN AMERICA: THE DEVELOPMENT
OF A BUSINESS METHOD, 1840-1980, at 3-7, 15-17, 67-70 (1992).
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law.10 1 Standard contracts often gave franchisors unequal power to
terminate franchise agreements. 102 This placed franchisees at a serious
disadvantage because they had made substantial investments in the
franchise on the assumption that there would be an ongoing business
relationship. Contract law, however, generally did not consider
investment-based expectations or protect franchisees from these kinds
of threats. 103 Other than common law, which was a highly imperfect fit
to these new business relationships, no regulatory regime existed to
address these public interest concerns. Arguably, this business
innovation-the franchise model-created a Gap. Franchising posed a
set of policy problems for which no regulatory regime existed.
Seeking to correct the balance of power, Congress passed the
Automobile Dealers Franchise Act ("ADFA") in 1956.104 The Act allowed
dealers to sue automakers for damages when automakers terminated
or failed to renew contracts without just cause or in bad faith. States
also took action to protect franchisees from potentially coercive actions
by manufacturers. For example, Georgia's Motor Vehicle Franchise
Practices Act created a cause of action for an automobile franchisee to
enjoin the establishment of a new dealership under the same franchisor
within the existing franchisee's "relevant market area," unless the
franchisor could show that the existing franchisee was
inadequate.105 Similarly, most states also restrict the direct sale of cars
to consumers, requiring automakers to sell through franchised
dealers. 106 These laws are intended to prevent carmakers from coercing
their own dealers by threatening to compete by underselling them. As
we shall see below, while originally intended to protect franchisees, this
restriction is potentially overinclusive if applied to Tesla, whose
business model relies exclusively on direct sales to consumers through
its own showrooms.
Unlike product franchising, which generally involves valuable,
durable, and complex goods, the product in business-format franchising
is usually a low-value nondurable good or service. The parent company
provides the business plan for the franchisee, including not only the
101. David Gurnick & Steve Vieux, Case History of the American Business Franchise, 24 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REV. 37, 50-51 (1999).
102. DICKE, supra note 100, at 72-79 (describing how Ford used the power of cancellation to
control dealers).
103. Gurnick & Vieux, supra note 101, at 50-51.
104. DICKE, supra note 100, at 82.
105. See GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-664(b) (West 2017).





product or service for sale but also the marketing and strategy-indeed,
the "brand." Business-format franchisees may sell hamburgers, carpet
cleaning, car repair, or donuts. Without the franchise branding, these
products would be difficult to distinguish from others offered by
businesses in the same industry. Gas stations provide a classic example.
Their main product, gasoline, generates low profit margins and is
indistinguishable from competitors' gas. 107 As a result, franchisors
provide significant branding support, a package of services the
franchisee relies on to operate the outlet. Consider why you buy gas at
Shell instead of at Dave's Gas across the street.1 08
As with product franchising, business-format franchising
quickly raised concerns over power imbalances. The franchise model
allowed many entrepreneurs to create small businesses, but it soon
became clear that they needed protections against fraud and unfair
business practices by the franchisors permitted under standard
franchise contracts. As one leading commentator notes:
[M]any terms in the typical franchise contract are susceptible to franchisor manipulation
throughout the life of the franchise relationship-relating to topics such as site selection,
layout, training, territories, advertising, renewals, and operating procedures. For many
of these types of clauses, the franchisee may reasonably believe-even be led by the
franchisor to believe-that its interests and those of the franchisor coincide or at least are
similar. The open-ended nature of these provisions, combined with the discretionary
powers vested in the franchisor, render those assumptions naive and often even harmful
to the franchisor's long-term business success. 10 9
A particularly problematic area for business-format franchisees
is renewal. Franchise contracts often have specified term periods (e.g.,
ten years) with the option for renewal on the part of the franchisor, who
has the power to alter the terms of the contract significantly when
renewing. 110 As with the problem described above for auto dealer
franchisees, business-format franchisees who have invested in a fast
food restaurant might find themselves vulnerable to hardball
negotiating tactics by the franchisor when renewal negotiations begin
because of their significant sunk costs. Given these power dynamics,
legislators began to recognize that the standard contract law
107. DICKE, supra note 100, at 87-88.
108. Id. at 116.
109. Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Contract Interpretation: A Two-Standard Approach, 2013
MICH. ST. L. REV. 641, 657-58 [hereinafter Emerson, Franchise Contract Interpretation]; see also
Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Contract Clauses and the Franchisor's Duty of Care Toward Its
Franchisees, 72 N.C. L. REV. 905, 907 (1994) [hereinafter Emerson, Franchise Contract Clauses]
(noting that courts in the event of a dispute, following contract law, would look to the terms of the
contract, but that both parties "tend to have legitimate expectations about their franchise
relationship that often go far beyond the terms" of the contract, and franchisees would often
"expect[] far more than what the written document promises").
110. Emerson, Franchise Contract Interpretation, supra note 109, at 658.
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assumption of relatively equal bargaining power among the parties
afforded inadequate protection for franchisees.1 1 1 Like product
franchises, business-format franchises created a Gap-a policy problem
for which no fitting regulatory response existed.
As a result, both federal and state governments have adopted
laws requiring disclosure and good-faith practices by franchisors.
Passed by Congress at the same time as the ADFA, the Petroleum
Marketing Practices Act ("PMPA") regulated the ability of refiners to
terminate contracts with gas stations without just cause or in bad
faith.112 Other state laws mandated disclosure of data on the financial
solvency of the franchise, a statement of the terms and conditions of
termination or refusal to renew the franchise relationship, disclosure of
any requirement that the franchisee purchase goods or services from
the franchisor's designee, and identification of any exclusive territory,
among other requirements.1 1 3 Other protections provided remedies to
franchisees adversely affected by the encroachment of new franchisees
under the same franchisor, including mandating good-faith
performance by the franchisor and setting standards for termination
and renewal of contracts. 114
The franchising case study provides a second clear example of
the relationship between business innovation and policy disruption over
time. In the nineteenth century, the common law legal structure was
designed to regulate relations between suppliers and the retailers with
whom they contracted. That structure proved inadequate in the
twentieth century to address the new business relationships created by
franchising. Again, in our taxonomy, franchising created a Gap. The
new franchise business model challenged the preexisting contractor
relationship, where companies would hire third parties to provide
services such as sales or distribution. Common law contract doctrines
111. Emerson, Franchise Contract Clauses, supra note 109, at 907 (noting that courts
"generally hesitate to do anything more than quickly examine whether the parties acted in good
faith and exercised fair dealing" even when considering "crucial franchisor decisions that affect
the franchised business's continuing viability"); Emerson, Franchise
Contract Interpretation, supra note 109, at 659-60 & 660 n.113 (identifying ways in which contract
law is inadequate in protecting franchisees); Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Terminations: Legal
Rights and Practical Effects when Franchisees Claim the Franchisor Discriminates, 35 AM. BUS.
L.J. 559, 579-80 (1998) (noting how standard contract doctrine of unconscionability will generally
not protect franchisees).
112. Robert W. Emerson & Uri Benoliel, Are Franchisees Well-Informed? Revisiting the Debate
Over Franchise Relationship Laws, 76 ALB. L. REV. 193, 199 (2013).
113. See William L. Killion, The History of Franchising, in FRANCHISING: CASES, MATERIALS,
& PROBLEMS 1, 19-21 (Alexander M. Meiklejohn ed., 2013); see also DICKE, supra note 100, at 158;
Emerson & Benoliel, supra note 112, at 197.
114. See Emerson & Benoliel, supra note 112, at 197; Robert W. Emerson, Franchising and
the Collective Rights of Franchisees, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1503, 1511 (1990).
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proved inadequate to prevent widespread abuses of both product and
business-format franchising by the franchisors. Either the franchisors
held too much power in the relationship and laws were needed to protect
franchisees from encroachment on their territory by new franchisees,
underselling by the franchisor company, and threats to go beyond the
contractual terms; or the franchisees were deemed to be at a bargaining
disadvantage and needed assistance from mandatory disclosure and
sourcing requirements. Because the traditional contract rules did not
take into account the realities of the new franchise system, the
mismatch was a Gap. As a result, new regulatory structures were
needed. Congress and state legislatures responded with statutory
reforms.
Business innovation in franchising, with the challenges it
presents to regulatory systems, remains a live issue today. State laws
intended to protect automobile dealer franchisees by banning direct
sales of automobiles by manufacturers are now a barrier to the new
business model developed by the electric car manufacturer Tesla. Tesla
has earned the ire of the nation's automobile dealerships by attempting
to sell its electric vehicles ("EVs") directly to consumers through its own
showrooms instead of through franchise dealerships. This represents
an effort to use a new form of business organization-forward
integration-and to avoid traditional distribution channels through
dealerships. Tesla CEO Elon Musk has claimed that traditional dealers
lack incentives to sell EVs that compete with their gasoline-powered
inventory and lack specialized knowledge about everything from
battery service to tax breaks for EVs. 115 Yet in response to the push for
reforms to move beyond the limits of contract law in the mid-twentieth
century, all fifty states have laws in place that protect dealers from
unequal bargaining power in the dealer-auto manufacturer
relationship, some of which would actually block Tesla from engaging
in direct consumer sales.116 Several states currently have in place rules
that would ban Tesla from selling its EVs through its showrooms.117 In
these states, Tesla may exhibit its vehicles in showrooms and discuss
115. Daniel A. Crane, Tesla, Dealer Franchise Laws, and the Politics of Crony Capitalism, 101
IOWA L. REV. 573, 580 (2015) (citing Elon Musk's concerns regarding dealers' lack of incentives to
sell EVs, and a 2014 Consumer Reports Study demonstrating Musk's concerns to be reflected in
actual dealer behavior); see also Cynthia Barmore, Tesla Unplugged: Automobile Franchise Laws
and the Threat to the Electric Vehicle Market, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 185, 189 (2014) (discussing state
laws that would ban Tesla's efforts to sell directly to consumers).
116. Crane, supra note 115, at 579.
117. Dana Hull & Margaret Cronin Fisk, Tesla Cranks Up Pressure to End Ban on Direct Auto
Sales, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 22, 2016, 7:37 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-
22/tesla-lawsuit-claims-michigan-direct-sales-ban-unconstitutional [https://perma.cc/BNK9-
P3NS] (listing Michigan, Texas, Connecticut, and Utah).
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vehicle design and technology, but showroom employees may not quote
prices. In contrast, other states allow Tesla to sell cars directly from its
showrooms.118 Existing car dealerships strongly support these
restrictions not only because of their original purpose of protecting
dealers from manipulation by manufacturers, but also because they cut
off a potential source of market competition. The policy disruption
question that arises in response to Tesla's business model innovation is
whether the direct-sales bans, which were originally meant to resolve
bargaining disparities between dealers and automakers, should exclude
an automaker like Tesla, which engages exclusively in direct sales.
This new conflict over franchising demonstrates how a legal
regime that arose in the past to protect a certain kind of business
model-franchisees-can end up hindering the development of new
business models, and thus how business innovation-in the form of
forward integration-can create policy disruption. This bears strong
similarities to the dynamics in the electricity case study. Existing law
is often bound tightly to one vision of how goods are produced or sold-
here, that a manufacturer sells goods (and services like repairs)
through a franchisee with whom it contracts, and any effort by that
manufacturer to integrate forward for direct sales would undercut that
relationship because it would compete directly with the
dealer/franchisee. But the rise of Tesla demonstrates that the existing
law may now be overinclusive. Some manufacturers have no interest in
using dealers at all and prefer instead to integrate forward to sell
directly to consumers. Their business model of forward integration has
created a possible Solution that is arguably overregulated under the
current legal regime.
Having established in Part I that business disruption need not
lead to policy disruption, and in Part II that business innovations have
challenged existing legal rules long before the rise of the platform
economy, Part III turns to the question of what this means for the
regulators.
118. On its own website, Tesla contends that has vehicle showrooms in AZ, CA, CO, CT, DC,
FL, GA, HI, IL, IN, MD, MA, MI, MN, MO, NV, NJ, NY, NC, OH, OR, PA, TN, TX, UT, VA, and
WA. US Tesla Stores and Galleries, TESLA, https://www.tesla.com/findus/list/stores
/United+States (last visited Sept. 19, 2017) [https://perma.cclYLC9-7HBS]; Katie Burke, Tesla





III. POLICY RESPONSES AND THE VALUE OF NEUTRALITY
Why should a mismatch between a business innovation and the
regulatory structure matter for policymakers? What different options
do policymakers have to respond to such a mismatch? And what should
guide policymakers in choosing among different regulatory options?
This Section starts by presenting the regulatory toolkit available
to address business innovations. It also explains the rationale for a
default rule of business neutrality. It then sets out a three-step process
for how regulators should choose to respond to policy disruptions and
ends by pulling this all together in a decision matrix.
A. The Regulator's Toolkit for Business Innovation
When a new business model leads to a policy disruption,
regulators necessarily face a set of choices. They could Block the upstart
from entering the market, either in light of public interest concerns or
because of old-fashioned rent seeking. Alternatively, they could do
nothing, giving the upstart a Free Pass and letting the old business
model and regulatory structure decline, with the loss of the associated
regulatory benefits from that regulatory structure. Or they could
pursue a middle ground and take some affirmative steps to continue to
promote the underlying policy goals while accommodating the new form
of business within the existing regulatory regime-a strategy we call
OldReg. If regulators determine that the existing regulatory structure
cannot accommodate the new form of business, they may need to craft
entirely new rules to replace the old-an approach we call NewReg.
They then face yet another choice-whether to create a new regulatory
structure that matches the new business model tightly or instead to
anticipate the possibility that even the new business model will one day
become obsolete, only to be replaced by an even newer model. All the
while, regulators are likely to face political pressures to preserve the
old business model and regulatory structure because the status quo
supports important public policy goals, compelling reliance interests
exist in the old system, or the threatened incumbents wield political
power.
We distill these various responses into a toolkit of four policy
strategies-Block, Free Pass, OldReg, and NewReg.119 These are set out
119. Our four categories are inspired by Carol Rose's seminal article, Rethinking
Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 9-10,
in which she offers four choices for regulators managing common-pool resources, including "Do-
Nothing," "Keepout," "Rightway," and "Prop." We note that Rose's focus was on what we might call
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in Table 2 below using the example of Uber to show their relevance.
These strategies are just as applicable outside of the platform economy,
as we shall see in Part IV when we apply this framework to Tesla
dealerships and rooftop solar generation.
the second-order question of which specific policy instrument is best in light of increasing
congestion on a resource. In contrast, we address the first-order question of whether and how to
apply existing legal rules to business innovation, while remaining largely agnostic about whether
existing rules are embodied in specific policy instruments like taxes, prescriptive rules, or other
types, as such questions are deeply context specific. We also do not limit our analysis to
management of common-pool resources.
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TABLE 2: REGULATORY TOOLKIT FOR POLICY DISRUPTIONS CREATED BY
BUSINESS INNOVATION
Regulatory Strategy Uber application
Tool
Interpret legal rules to block the new form Only licensed taxis
Block of business and preserve existing with medallions can
regulatory and business structures. serve in this market;
Uber is not permitted
to operate at all.
Allow the business innovation to proceed Uber is permitted to
Free Pass without changing the regulatory structure, serve this market, and
potentially consigning the previous existing legal rules for
business model and its associated taxis only apply to
regulatory structure to extinction. taxis; Uber remains
cheaper than taxis and
crowds out taxis; the




Allow the new firm to enter the market, but Existing safety rules
OldReg apply existing legal rules. This approach for taxi vehicles and
will impose additional regulatory costs on taxi drivers are
the new business models but aims for a designed to protect
somewhat level playing field between customers' safety;
incumbents and innovators. Uber is like a taxi;
existing safety rules
for vehicles and
drivers apply to Uber
just as they do for
taxis, increasing the
cost of Uber but not
blocking its entry into
the market.
Develop new regulatory structures and Do away with
NewReg legal categories entirely. Like QidReg, medallions and the
NewReg can strive for neutrality between current legal regime
incumbents and innovators, but need not governing taxi drivers
always be neutral, and vehicles; adopt





So how does the toolkit of regulatory strategies interact with our
earlier typology of policy disruption? In brief, all four strategies are on
the table for End-runs. Block, Free Pass, and addReg may require some
threshold determinations about how the existing regime applies. In the
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
case of Tennessee's approach to Airbnb discussed above, for example,
the Tennessee Attorney General had to decide whether hosts fit the
existing definition of hotel for purposes of hotel occupancy taxes. Ruling
that they do placed them into the OldReg regime; a ruling that they do
not would have given them a Free Pass. The same type of analysis
applies to whether Uber vehicles require some form of medallion or
license (OldReg) or not (Free Pass). Exemptions generally cannot be
closed with a Block or OldReg strategy when the existing exemption
clearly applies to the business innovation. Nor can a Gap disruption be
prevented or contained with Block or OldReg strategies when there
plainly is no law to apply in the existing legal landscape. And on the flip
side, Free Pass may or may not be applicable to Solutions, depending
upon how flexibly a regulator can apply existing rules. A NewReg
approach may be required.
An important question raised by the strategies Free Pass,
OldReg, and NewReg, each of which allows the business innovation to
enter the market, is whether to take into account reliance interests in
the existing system. For example, should taxi drivers be compensated
for the drop in their medallion value? A classic strategy to address such
interests would be through side payments, a strategy we call Buy Out.
The case for a Buy Out is arguably strongest if the innovator gets a Free
Pass, as this regulatory choice is likely to be most prejudicial to an
incumbent. The case for a Buy Out is weaker if the regulator chooses
NewReg, as this strategy can balance regulatory costs between
incumbents and new business models. The case for a Buy Out is
ambiguous when regulators choose simply to apply existing regulations
(OldReg)-which may have been designed with incumbent business
models in mind-to new business models. In cases of an OldReg
strategy, incumbents may still have some advantage over new business
models, though the opposite is also possible.
The choice among these strategies depends fundamentally on the
legitimacy and continuing relevance of the substantive goals of the
existing regulatory structure. If the prior regulatory structure did not
improve social welfare-for example, if instead it promoted rent seeking
on the part of the regulated entity to exclude competition-then
policymakers should welcome the policy disruption created by the new
business model. But if the original regime's goals are legitimate,
policymakers should consider a response that preserves these
fundamental interests. Moreover, the value of business innovation
must be considered in its own right. If the disruptive business is
successful enough to attract customers and lead to regulatory
disruption, it is likely offering benefits to the public that the current
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business and regulatory environment lacks. Choosing among these
strategies also implicates more mundane concerns about the
administrative fit between existing legal rules and new business
models. Whether existing law can be administered and enforced against
new market entrants may likewise inform the choice between an
OldReg or a NewReg strategy.
Simply listing the policy factors motivating the existing legal
structure and trying to balance among them, however, is not a useful or
coherent framework. It offers insufficient guidance to regulators beyond
saying, "Here's the toolkit, now you choose." 120 In selecting the
appropriate regulatory response to business innovation, there must be
a larger normative goal at stake than what seems a fair balance in the
moment. In cases of policy disruption, we therefore propose a default
principle of organizational neutrality as the best way to balance
promotion of business innovation with the need to protect the public
interest and to avoid rent seeking.
B. Neutrality as a Default Principle
Transaction costs, including regulatory costs, affect
entrepreneurs' choices about how to organize their business. 121 And
regulations can either facilitate or stifle business innovation. A legal
regime that favors one form of business organization-such as taxi
fleets owned by a central organization rather than platforms matching
private vehicle owners with those in need of rides-may Block business
innovation that could improve overall social welfare. 122 To counteract
the potential distortions on business innovation, a principle of
organizational neutrality would force regulators to focus not on the form
of business, but on its substance, and how that substance interacts with
important policy goals. 123
120. As noted previously, this is how most of the legal scholarship on the platform economy
proceeds. See supra notes 39-41.
121. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
122. Cf. Buccola, supra note 9, at 505 (arguing that the Court's decisions regarding the
constitutional rights of corporations seek to minimize these regulatory costs of integration into
business firms, because "[1]egal rules privileging one form of organization over others threaten to
induce entrepreneurs to choose relatively inefficient governance structures, a form of waste that
ultimately impoverishes society at large").
123. Id. at 511 (noting that "positive law might direct otherwise" and thus designating the
principle as a canon of interpretation). Here we take the position that neutrality should not only
inform interpretation of existing law, but further that it should inform the drafting of new laws
and regulations as well. We also note that the new market entrants may develop either new




The concept of organizational neutrality should guide
policymakers when business innovation leads to regulatory disruption
because it reduces the relative regulatory costs of innovation. In
colloquial terms, the neutrality principle dictates that entrepreneurs
should be neither penalized nor subsidized for their choices about how
to organize their business in order to promote innovation and efficient
use of resources.1 24 In an ideal world, neutrality would offer a level
playing field between incumbents, the innovators of today, and the
innovators of the future.1 25 This approach ensures that customers are
not deprived of the potential benefits of innovation by regulatory
systems that screen out or Block new business models. At the same
time, the neutrality principle acknowledges that innovators should not
be permitted simply to engage in regulatory arbitrage, or to exploit legal
loopholes in ways that give the innovator a Free Pass-an unfair
advantage over incumbents-especially if the substance of the
innovator's business raises the same kinds of public interest concerns
as the incumbent.
Yet our approach does not elevate neutrality or the promotion of
innovation as the sole outcome-determinative factor. The need to
protect the public interest through regulations-be it to promote safety,
environmental considerations, antidiscrimination principles, or other
factors-can sometimes outweigh the desire to promote innovation. As
we discuss in depth below, there may be good reasons to Block the entry
of certain types of firms, or to give other innovators a Free Pass because
their benefits significantly outweigh any desire for a level playing field.
Recognizing that neutrality is only a default-one that can be overcome
by other factors-ensures that members of the public, including
consumers and third parties, do not lose important regulatory benefits.
C. The Three-Step Process for Managing Policy Disruption
With organizational neutrality as an explicit normative goal, we
propose a three-step analysis for managing policy disruption:
At Step One, regulators should measure existing rules against
the default principle of organizational neutrality to ask whether they
privilege one form of business organization over another. If existing
rules cannot be interpreted in a neutral way because they either favor
124. Id. (discussing how the Court's decisions about constitutional rights seek neither to
"penalize" nor "subsidize" integration of business into a corporate form).
125. We acknowledge that perfect neutrality may be difficult to achieve; however, we contend
that striving toward neutrality should be the guiding default principle.
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existing business models over innovative business models or the
reverse, it may be necessary to rethink the regulatory regime.
At Step Two, regulators should ask whether any relevant factors
warrant deviation from a neutral default, such as the need to protect
health, safety, the environment, privacy, or distributional
considerations, or to prevent discrimination.
At Step Three, regulators should ask whether any reliance
interests in the existing regime should be addressed, and if so, whether
they could be addressed through alternative legal mechanisms designed
to protect people from being unfairly harmed by legal transitions. By
using alternative means to address reliance interests in the "old" rules,
such as side payments or other transition supports, regulators can
avoid distorting the regulatory playing field for future innovators.
This three-step process offers the best way to balance three
competing concerns: (1) preserving incentives for business innovation
that neither penalize newcomers or new forms of organization not
contemplated by regulators of the past, nor subsidize them by
permitting their exploitation of loopholes to the detriment of the public
interest; (2) effectuating the purpose of laws designed to protect the
public interest; and (3) reducing incentives for regulatory arbitrage and
rent seeking, while preserving reasonable reliance interests. 126 Static
legal categories-and the "demons" and "angels" they createl 27 -often
generate efforts to develop new corporate forms simply to avoid such
rules. Finally, a neutral approach can render the law more durable as
new forms of business organization will inevitably arise to replace the
innovations of today.
The flow chart below integrates the regulatory toolkit of Block,
Free Pass, OldReg, and NewReg with the three-step framework for
regulators. The following section then explains the framework in more
detail.
126. Indeed, we agree with Williamson's caveat that while firms can serve "affirmative
economic purposes," they can sometimes "pursue antisocial objectives." Williamson, supra note 16,
at 1538. These antisocial purposes are precisely the kinds of third-party effects that must be
addressed by a system of law and regulation. In some cases, such laws and regulations can be
applied regardless of the form of business organization; in other cases, neutrality may be
outweighed by the need to address such negative or otherwise antisocial impacts.
127. Cf. Michael Gerrard, Demons and Angels in Hazardous Waste Regulation: Are Justice,
Efficiency, and Democracy Reconcilable?, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 706 (1998) (arguing that
environmental law regulating hazardous waste demonizes certain firms at the end of industrial




Does the existing legal regime treat the innovator differently from the incumbent based
on its form of business organization?
Does it Block entry of the innovator and protect incumbents? Does it give the innovator
a Free Pass to the detriment of the incumbent?
Default principle should be organizationally neutral law
Step Two:
Should the neutral default be outweighed by public policy factors?
If res: B/ock or Free Pass (non-neutral), depending upon whether the policy concerns
outweigh neutrality principle
If no: OldReg or XNeReg (both can approach neutrality), depending upon whether
existing rules can be applied to both the incumbent and the innovator, and whether the
innovator raises any new policy concerns
Step Three;
Does the policy strategy upset an incumbent's reliance interests, dilute revenue streams,
or strand assets for the incumbent in ways that we should care about? If so, consider
adding a Biu Out to the chosen strategy.
ree Past strongest case for a Biu Out
NewReg weaker case for a B&! Out
O/dReg intermediate case for a Bit Out
1. Step One: A Neutral Default
At Step One, the policymaker must determine whether the
existing legal regime treats the innovator differently from the
incumbent based on its form of business organization. The policy toolkit
described above helps make this clear. For example, does the existing
policy Block the entry of the business innovator through a licensing
scheme or supply cap? Does existing law not apply to the newcomer,
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giving it a subsidy over existing firms in the market (Free Pass)? Is the
law capable of interpretation to include the business innovator
(OldReg)? Or, is existing law incapable of accommodating the newcomer
without amendment (NewReg)?128
In simple terms, if the current legal regime favors certain
business models over others, this raises normative concerns both about
stifling innovation and protecting the public interest. As a matter of
neutrality, both Block and Free Pass are presumptively nonneutral and
are therefore disfavored under our analytical framework. A Block
strategy is potentially overinclusive-it would preclude new business
models from entering the market regardless of whether they offer
significant benefits to consumers and the public over existing forms of
business. Free Pass is potentially underinclusive; it permits innovation
but may not sufficiently protect public interest concerns and allows for
regulatory arbitrage. In contrast, both OldReg and NewReg offer a
potentially more neutral approach. The choice between them depends
upon a number of factors, including whether existing rules can be
interpreted broadly to apply to both the incumbent and the innovator,
and whether the innovator raises the same or different policy concerns
as the incumbent.
This can be shown using the categories of policy disruption
described in Part I. End-runs, Exemptions, and Gaps raise the
underinclusiveness problem-the business innovation arguably is not
subject to regulation but should be because the substance of the
business (if not its form) raises the same kinds of concerns as the
incumbent. To give one example, if antidiscrimination rules under the
Fair Housing Act specifically exempt individuals who rent out space to
128. As an example of how a regulator might adopt an OldReg approach, the Tennessee
Attorney General issued an opinion concluding that "hosts" using Airbnb and other room-rental
platforms are no different from hotels for purposes of paying occupancy taxes. State of Tenn. Office
of the Attorney Gen., Opinion No. 15-78: Tax on Short-Term Rentals of Homes, Apartments, and
Rooms Arranged Through Websites (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.tn.gov/assets/entities/
attorneygeneral/opinions/opl5-78.pdf [https://perma.cc/G3Z4-C7WH]:
[T]he individuals who rent their homes on a short-term basis via the websites are the
owners or lessees of the "hotels" and have control over the "hotels." The websites are
not the owners or lessees of the "hotels" and do not have control over the "hotels." The
individuals who rent their homes via the websites are therefore the "operators" of the
"hotels" and are responsible for collecting and remitting the hotel occupancy privilege
tax.
This regulatory response to a perceived End-run-where it was not clear whether the existing law
applied to Airbnb-raised the possibility that Airbnb "hosts" might be treated differently from
hotels with respect to taxes, or, in essence, that they would receive a Free Pass. The regulator's
conclusion to adopt an OldReg strategy effectuated not only the underlying default principle of
neutrality as between incumbent hotels and Airbnb "hosts," but also continued to protect the public
interest by ensuring that taxes needed to fund state operations would be collected.
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roommates, then some of Airbnb's hosts fit into a clear exception-an
Exemption. Stepping into a regulator's shoes at Step One, a Block
strategy cannot apply to an Exemption, because the innovator fits into
a clear legal exception. 129 Therefore, the regulator must choose among
the remaining options. To give Airbnb a Free Pass would likewise be
nonneutral, and would subsidize this platform as compared to hotels,
potentially facilitating discrimination in short-term housing rentals,
and would risk underenforcing important national antidiscrimination
norms. Therefore, at Step One, a neutral approach would suggest that
an OldReg or NewReg strategy is preferable to a Free Pass.130
On the other hand, some forms of policy disruption are based on
overinclusive regulations-the business innovation is subject to
regulation but arguably should not be. This phenomenon is particularly
evident in the case of a Solution. The rise of distributed generation
mitigates climate change as compared to conventional power
generation, which was regulated in order to address different public
policy concerns. Similarly, Tesla's desire to sell electric vehicles directly
to consumers does not raise the same public policy concerns about
unequal bargaining power between franchisors and franchisees that
motivated states to adopt franchising laws. For business innovations
raising overinclusiveness problems, the biggest concern is if regulators
apply a nonneutral Block strategy, as this would deprive consumers of
the benefits of the business innovation. A Free Pass strategy would also
be nonneutral, and might raise ancillary concerns about reliance
interests at Step Three. So the next question in each case is whether
policy considerations should outweigh the neutrality principle, which
favors OldReg or NewReg at Step One. For example, some local
jurisdictions in Tennessee imposed OldReg zoning and hotel
regulations on room-rental platforms, some adopted NewReg
approaches allowing room rentals to continue under conditions less
restrictive than the existing hotel regime, and the state legislature
introduced but later withdrew legislation preempting local regulation,
which would have given the hosts Free Pass advantages.13 1
129. Of course, if the decisionmaker is the legislature rather than an agency, then the Block
strategy can be applied to an Exemption, since the legislature can amend the law. Given the
authority to change the law, the question for the legislature is the policy desirability of such a
change.
130. If the decisionmaker is a regulatory agency, there may be statutory constraints on how
creative it can be in developing NewReg options. Again, such limits do not apply to a legislature.
131. See supra note 51.
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2. Step Two: When Should Neutrality Be Outweighed by Other
Factors?
At Step Two, the primary question is whether a default
preference for neutrality should be outweighed by other factors, most
importantly concerns about protecting the public interest. While
organizational neutrality should operate as a default rule, there may be
compelling reasons in particular cases to override it and instead prefer
certain types of business organization over others. Not all existing
regulatory regimes that have an impact on the structure of business
were intended solely to promote rent seeking. There may well have been
sound, public-interest oriented reasons for those regimes and sound
reasons to retain some of their underlying goals.
For example, health, safety, and land-use regulations that
currently govern hotels assume that most provision of hospitality will
occur through businesses that are hierarchical in nature, that employ
at least one full-time employee, and in which the firm (which is the
regulatory target) owns the property being rented for short-term stays.
While the size of an existing hotel operation might range from a small
bed-and-breakfast to a hotel with hundreds of rooms, it is a
fundamentally different kind of business model than the one facilitated
by services like Airbnb, which allow individual homeowners or renters
to gain income from renting out spare rooms or apartments for short
periods of time. The existing regulatory model presumes a level of
investment and commitment by an owner that makes feasible
important safety requirements like fire inspections, health inspections,
and limitations on location to commercial zones to minimize costs to
neighboring homeowners. Homeowners renting their home out for a few
weeks a year when they are on vacation, or their spare upstairs
bedroom, arguably do not have the time, expertise, or capacity to comply
with these requirements. These legal requirements increase regulatory
costs for regulated entities-and homeowners who need not comply
with them can accordingly rent out their properties at lower rates. 132
This example suggests that here, important public policy
concerns about fire safety and antidiscrimination principles actually
point in the same direction as the neutrality principle-against a Free
Pass, and toward an OldReg or NewReg strategy. While an OldReg
132. This problem is even more acute when an entire apartment building is taken over by one
owner and run essentially as a hotel-but free of regulation. Hugo Martin, Airbnb and Other





strategy might be best to apply existing safety rules to individuals
renting out their homes or rooms via Airbnb's platform, the new
business structures may require a NewReg strategy so as to ensure that
homeowners can plausibly comply with them and reduce the incentives
for evasion of the regulatory system by homeowners. And if regulators
determined that either safety, residential zoning restrictions, or
antidiscrimination principles were so important and could not be
enforced even through new rules effectively, then a Block strategy
might even be warranted.
To give a second example, both the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act and the Surface Mining Reclamation Act contain
provisions that have the effect of keeping small businesses out of certain
markets-the transportation, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste,
and coal mining, respectively. 13 3 Both statutes have this effect because
they impose such severe financial assurance requirements that they
privilege certain corporate forms with the capacity to raise large
amounts of capital.1 34 Such laws are arguably inconsistent with the
default principle of organizational neutrality. Yet there may be
countervailing reasons why we want to Block small businesses from
entering these markets. For example, we might want to make sure that
in the event of a spill of hazardous materials, the firm has the capacity
and resources to clean it up and protect public safety, rather than file
for bankruptcy protection. Protecting the public interest may justify
ensuring that firms engaged in hazardous occupations are sufficiently
capitalized to address releases of such hazardous materials. In such a
case, a strategy of Block would be appropriate, not to promote rent-
seeking behavior, but to address hazards specific to the industry that
have not yet been solved by new forms of business organization. If, in
the future, new forms of business organization can solve these
problems, then an OldReg or NewReg strategy may become appropriate.
Similarly, the entry of new firms into regulated electricity markets was
restricted or prohibited on the grounds that the monopoly for the
incumbent utility was a fair tradeoff for the guaranteed service that the
utility provided to customers in its service areas. 135 Subsequent
innovations in business-like the rise of independent generators-
challenged this assumption. Other relevant policy goals may include
133. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 ("SMCRA"), 30 U.S.C. § 25 (2012);
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2012); 40 C.F.R. §§ 263-265
(2016).
134. 30 U.S.C. §§ 415 (c)(1)(B), 509; 40 C.F.R. §§ 258.70-258.75, 264.140-264.151. Thanks to
David Spence on this point.
135. See supra Part II.
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protecting public health, safety, the environment, or antidiscrimination
principles.
3. Step Three: Addressing Reliance Interests
Reliance interests raise another important challenge for
organizational neutrality. For instance, in the context of the electricity
industry in the United States, restricting entry to the industry and
entrenching a regulated incumbent with a guaranteed monopoly was
tied to the important policy goals of ensuring universal service for all
customers and cross subsidization of some customers by others. We
might be concerned about the reliance interests of those parties who
reasonably invested in the prior business model and regulatory regime.
There are plausible arguments that major utilities undertook billions of
dollars of investments based on promises of recouping those
investments through consumer rate payments under the prior system.
Dismantling the regulatory structure and the associated business
model would strand these assets. 136 A similar argument could be made
for taxi fleet owners who invested in medallions under existing legal
rules. These significant investments have now diminished in value with
the rise of Uber and may become altogether valueless if unrestricted
entry into the transportation-for-hire -sector is permitted. 137
136. Sini Matikainen, What are Stranded Assets?, LONDON SCH. ECON. (Aug. 23, 2016),
http://www.1se.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/faqs/what-are-stranded-assets/ [https://perma.ccfF73V-
B93X]; see Jonas J. Monast, Maximizing Utility in Electric Utility Regulation, 43 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 135, 163-64 (2015) (noting how costs associated with stranded assets "are typically borne by
customers in accordance with rates approved by state regulatory commissions" (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Duke Energy, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule on Carbon Pollution
Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources (Dec. 12, 2014), https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602-23983 [https://perma.cc/C4F2-NDC4])); J. Gregory Sidak
& Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of Regulatory Contract, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV.
851, 866-69 (1996) (discussing deregulation and its impacts on stranded investments and stranded
costs).
137. Indeed, taxi medallion owners filed suit against the City of New York, arguing that the
city has violated the Takings Clause by permitting Uber to enter that market, thus diminishing
the value of their medallions. However, the district court dismissed their Takings claim as unripe
because they had failed first to seek "just compensation" under state law for the alleged Taking.
Melrose Credit Union v. City of New York, No. 15-cv-09042 (AJN), - F.Supp.3d -, 2017 WL
1200902, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2017). While incumbents may seek transition relief under the
Takings Clause, it is not at all clear that they will be successful, especially if they are claiming
that the government's "failure to regulate" (a strategy of Free Pass) led to a taking of their property.
For a discussion of whether the government's failure to act can serve as the basis for a Takings
claim, see Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State's Affirmative Duty to Protect Property,
113 MICH. L. REV. 345, 345 (2014) (arguing that governments can violate the Takings Clause by
"failing to act in the face of a changing world" as in the case of climate change). While we recognize
that the Takings Clause may afford one avenue, in certain types of cases, for transition relief, we
contend that it would be preferable to adopt alternative methods of transition relief, rather than
to expand Takings Clause jurisprudence.
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A neutral approach does not diminish these reliance interests,
but instead would require asking at Step Three whether some of the
protections against legal transitions could be addressed through
alternative regulatory schemes, such as through side payments. Using
alternative methods of compensation such as one-time side payments
would avoid penalizing business innovation by virtue of baking soon-to-
be anachronistic assumptions into the long-term regulatory structure.
We refer to such side payments as a Buy Out strategy that could
potentially accompany the strategies of Free Pass, OldReg, or NewReg.
An incumbent's claim for a Buy Out might be strongest in a Free Pass
scenario-in which an upstart is simply permitted to do an End-run
around the law, or exploit Gaps or Exemptions, and thus is essentially
subsidized by failure to apply existing legal rules. A strategy of
NewReg-which, in an ideal world would place different forms of
business on equal footing-occupies a weaker ground on the Buy Out
question. Under an OldReg scenario, an incumbent's claim for Buy Out
is ambiguous. On the one hand, the incumbent's claim could be at its
weakest, in that the existing regulatory regime is applied to the upstart,
making for a more level playing field between the two forms of business,
especially if the regulatory regime was designed with the incumbent in
mind. Yet applying existing law could still favor innovators. Perfect
neutrality is hard to achieve in practice, and a firm that once received
a legal subsidy and now loses it will perceive this loss as a penalty. 138
In the end, interest group politics matters and Buy Out may turn as
much on political economy as concerns over equity.
D. So What?
In this Article, we have developed two distinct but
complementary frameworks. The first identified the different ways
business innovations create policy disruptions. Each type of innovation,
whether End-run, Exemption, Gap, or Solution, raises specific policy
questions. The second laid out the regulatory toolkit for addressing
policy disruptions caused by business innovations-Block, Free Pass,
OldReg, and NewReg. Knowing the type of disruption and the available
tools, however, does not necessarily tell the regulator what to do
without some additional information. For that, we proposed a three-
138. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative
Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297 (1992) (discussing loss aversion in
the context of cumulative prospect theory); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in
Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1039, 1047-48 (1991) ("The basic
intuition concerning loss aversion is that losses . .. loom larger than corresponding gains . . . .").
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step process based on a default rule of organizational neutrality for
regulators to decide how and when to use their toolkit. Bringing this all
together, Table 3 sets out a general framework for how regulators
should manage business innovations that disrupt policy. By its very
nature, any effort to encapsulate complexities in this way involves some
degree of oversimplification, and other regulatory responses may be
possible. As we explain below, however, we believe this kind of
summary can be helpful.
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TABLE 3: FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATING BUSINESS INNOVATION
Policy concerns Innovation Neutral default
significantly benefits outweighs policy
outweigh neutral significantly concerns and
default outweigh neutral innovation
default benefits
End-run Block NewReg OldReg
Innovator raises Prohibit innovator Develop new Apply existing
the same from entering regulatory legal rules to
underlying policy market structures innovator
concerns as the or or or
incumbent under OldReg Free Pass NewReg
existing legal rules, Apply existing Allow innovator to Develop new
and existing rules legal rules to enter market regulatory
could be applied innovator (if without applying structures
existing rules are existing rules
nonneutral)
Exemption Block Free Pass NewReg
Innovator raises Prohibit innovator Allow innovator to Develop new
the same from entering enter market regulatory
underlying policy market, which without applying structures
concerns as the may require existing rules
incumbent under NewReg (new or
existing legal rules, legal rules) NewReg
but existing Jegal Develop new
rules d not neatv regulatory
tapply structures
Gap NewReg Free Pass NewReg
Innovator raises Develop new Allow innovator to Develop new
new policy regulatory enter market regulatory
concerns not structures without applying structures
contemplated by existing rules





Solution N/A Free Pass NewReg
Innovator Allow innovator to Develop new
substantially enter market, regulatory
reduces policy which may require structures
concerns NewReg (new








Identifying policy disruptions, regulatory tools, and a process for
how to apply the tools is all well and good, but is this useful? In other
words, does this meaningfully contribute to the field? We argue that it
does for four main reasons.
First, our framework complements public choice theory, which
involves the application of economic concepts to the legislative or
regulatory process in order to offer a positive theory of how policies
develop. 139 Public choice provides a powerful explanation for the
dynamic of rent seeking in the face of business innovation, where
incumbents create private benefits by excluding entry. And aspects of
this are certainly present in the Uber and electricity stories. But rent
seeking is at best only a partial explanation for the policy conflicts. Nor,
more importantly, does identifying an instance of rent seeking as a
descriptive matter tell regulators what to do about it. Our framework
goes beyond a positive account of how policy disruption occurs; we offer
a normative default principle of neutrality and a structured analytical
framework to balance a public interest perspective toward regulation
with a more economically minded focus on the costs of regulation.
Second, our framework goes beyond the standard law and
economics model, which argues that the purpose of the regulatory state
is to promote efficiency and to increase overall social welfare. 140 While
we offer neutrality as a default principle, neutrality is not merely about
reducing costs and promoting economic efficiency. Nor is it about
promoting innovation at any cost. Rather, it examines the relative
regulatory costs faced by incumbents and innovators; neutrality seeks
to level the playing field. And neutrality is a default principle, one that
can be overcome by other public interest factors.
Third, we believe that this framework is helpful because it sets
forth several "ideal types"-scenarios that have occurred repeatedly
throughout the history of business innovation and policy disruption. Yet
these types are not mutually exclusive. In some instances, an
innovation, taking into account all its policy implications, will land
entirely in one of the boxes in Table 3. But many cases will present
hybrids implicating more than one box. A business innovation might
create the same kind of policy problem as the incumbent in one area of
the law, but may also create new policy problems not currently
regulated by existing legal rules or solve other problems contemplated
139. See, e.g., James M. Buchanan, The Domain of Constitutional Economics, 1 CONST. POL.
ECON. 1 (1990).
140. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARv. L. REv. 961
(2001) (arguing that maximizing social welfare should be the goal of legal policy).
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by existing regulatory structures. This would necessitate a combination
of policy responses.
Finally, while we have envisioned this framework as a guide for
policymakers, there is another set of lessons embedded within it;
lessons for another audience-firm managers and business
innovators-that we can only briefly touch on here. For instance,
consider the situation in which the innovator raises no significant new
policy concerns at all. This is the Netflix example-when the firm began
its business model by sending DVDs via the U.S. mail. This business
innovation got a Free Pass in terms of the regulatory state-sending
DVDs via the mail eliminated the policy concerns its brick-and-mortar
competitors presented under land-use law and did not raise significant
new policy concerns that regulators needed to address. The only
significant harms were market-oriented-harms to its competitors, like
Blockbuster. Just as this framework can provide guidance to
policymakers, so too, business innovators should recognize its value.
Innovators want to be in the world of Free Passes, where perhaps a
NewReg regime is second best; they most definitely want to avoid a
Block; and they likely will find OldReg an uncomfortable domain. This
framework can and should guide them as they strategize about how best
to organize their businesses to ensure that the regulatory state plays a
positive role in innovation.
IV. PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE THREE-STEP PROCESS
Part IV puts our framework to the test, applying the three-step
analysis to current policy challenges described in the case studies of
Part 11-the rise of distributed energy generation and Tesla's efforts to
sell its electric vehicles directly to consumers.
A. The Case of Distributed Generation
As we explained in Part II, the dominant regulatory model for
electric utilities had a legitimate public purpose-to guarantee
universal, nondiscriminatory service for customers at reasonable rates.
In order to achieve this goal, and relying on certain assumptions about
economies of scale, the government gave utilities monopoly power to
generate, distribute, and sell electricity. This regulatory structure
created incentives for vertically integrated firms to invest in expensive
infrastructure like generation capacity, transmission lines, and
distribution systems. Rate regulation simultaneously addressed
consumer concerns over the industry's monopoly power while ensuring
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a reasonable rate of return and continued investment. Since the
original electrification of America, there has been a long set of iterative
interactions between business innovation and regulatory innovation.
Sometimes business model innovations have provoked regulatory
changes. In other cases, regulatory changes have provoked the
development of new business models, and sometimes these business
and regulatory disruptions have been mutually endogenous.
A combination of regulatory change in key statutes and FERC
Orders, technological innovation in the development of rooftop solar,
and market developments like the emergence of businesses like Solar
City and Sungevity has led to the rise of distributed electricity
generation. We would recognize at Step One of the organizational
neutrality analysis that in some cases distributed generation is Blocked
or penalized to the point of exclusion by existing legal rules. 141 The
principle of organizational neutrality would say as a default that the
upstart rooftop solar providers (whether organized as firms or
individuals) should be neither penalized nor subsidized for innovating
in their form of business organization. They should not be penalized by
virtue of using new organizational forms and new technologies-they
should be permitted to interconnect with the grid and to contribute
power and receive compensation on equal terms with existing utilities
that provide the same product (electricity). They should also, however,
not be subsidized by virtue of their business innovation if they are using
existing transmission or distribution lines. And third parties should
likewise not be penalized by a law that prohibits new market entrants
trying to deliver the same product. Yet the existing regulatory structure
governing electricity generation is so intimately bound up with one form
of business organization-the vertically integrated firm-that it likely
cannot be interpreted in a neutral way. In other words, an OldReg
strategy is likely not possible. Rather, new law is required (NewReg).
Step Two in the analysis would require asking whether any
relevant factors would warrant deviation from the neutral default, such
as health, safety, or distributional consequences. Recognizing that the
rise of solar power and distributed solar or other renewable energy
generation can reduce deleterious fossil fuel emissions, this
technological development is clearly a Solution and thus ought to be
141. For example, the Nevada Supreme Court recently blocked a vote on a referendum that
would have restored favorable rates for net-metering solar customers after the state public utilities
commission sought to impose higher fees on distributed solar generation. Julia Pyper, Nevada





encouraged. Yet rooftop solar and distributed generation do raise the
same kinds of policy concerns about cross subsidization and ensuring
financial support for infrastructure and distribution lines that the
current policy regime is designed to address. This suggests that a Free
Pass is not warranted, but instead that a NewReg strategy would better
protect these policy interests. The entry of rooftop solar could, however,
have negative distributional consequences for those who cannot afford
to use rooftop solar.
At Step Three, it would become clear that reliance interests are
heavily implicated. Allowing net metering with rooftop solar would
raise concerns about reliance interests, because utilities have fixed
costs to maintain transmission and distribution lines and because
rooftop solar providers may not be contributing adequately to those
goods that serve distributional interests. 142 A neutral approach would
require asking whether some of the protections against legal
transitions-a Buy Out-could be addressed through side payments
raised through general tax revenues.
B. The Case of Tesla
A second example of how the neutrality principle would operate
arises out of state franchise rules that would prohibit Tesla from selling
its products to consumers. The issue is whether the direct-sales bans,
which were originally meant to resolve bargaining disparities between
dealers and automakers, should Block an automaker like Tesla, which
engages exclusively in direct sales. The principle of organizational
neutrality would set a default at Step One that Tesla should neither be
penalized nor subsidized for its new form of business organization-
forward integration-in selling cars to consumers. A total ban (Block)
seems like a clear penalty in this regard. If these laws could be
interpreted simply not to apply to Tesla (Free Pass), that would permit
its entry into the markets without regulatory penalty. The concerns
that motivated these laws-coercive practices by auto manufacturers
toward dealers (e.g., forcing them to take unwanted inventory and
threatening not to supply them with inventory in the future if they
refused)-would not apply to a forward-integrated firm in which the
manufacturer also is selling the vehicles directly, making an OldReg
strategy unwarranted or impossible to implement. If such a neutral,
142. Rooftop solar/distributed generation also arguably falls under the category of Solutions
because the innovation solves a problem that the incumbent presents for the future under the
extant regime-namely, the climate problem.
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purposive interpretation is impossible, then organizational neutrality
would require changing the law (NewReg).
At Step Two, a neutral approach would require asking whether
other third-party interests and factors are implicated in a meaningful
way. Because the purpose of these laws is intimately bound with
correcting for coercive bargaining tactics, Step Two merges into Step
Three in this example. The parties bring protected are not third parties
or members of the public, but rather, parties to the dealership franchise
agreements.
Step Three requires asking if there remains any continuing need
to protect dealers from coercive tactics by manufacturers (Step Two) or
to compensate dealers for legal transitions if they lose business as a
result of a legal change (Step Three). In this case, existing dealers of
gasoline-powered vehicles may continue to sell their wares; they simply
face competition from a new product. And unlike the IOUs in the case
of electricity generation, existing dealers have not undertaken
extensive investments in infrastructure which Tesla would be using for
free; nor did entrants have to pay a significant sum to enter the market
that Tesla would not pay (i.e., the costs of setting up a showroom), as in
the case of taxi medallion owners. Thus, the case for any kind of
transition relief is weaker in the Tesla context than for distributed
generation. Even if regulators wanted to provide some kind of transition
relief, again, a neutral approach would require asking whether such
ends must be achieved through these regulations or some other method,
such as side payments, general revenue, or other legal rules against
fraud or coercion in contracting, that would allow the overall regulatory
regime to permit business innovation without "nonneutral" distortions.
And while a strategy of Free Pass ordinarily might make a strong case
for Buy Out; here, it is not clear that the claim to transitional payments
is as strong where Tesla is not exploiting a loophole in the law. This is
not an End-run, but a Solution. Existing legal rules will continue to
protect dealers from power disparities in relation to manufacturers, and
Tesla's presence is simply orthogonal to the problem that the original
legislation was designed to address. The only question is who is going
to sell more cars. To the extent that Tesla's direct sales raise new policy
concerns, it may also be considered a Gap. And regulators will need to
respond accordingly with new legal rules.
CONCLUSION
This Article has offered a framework for understanding an
important subset of policy disruptions-those that arise when
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innovative business models strain existing laws that are themselves
built on assumptions about how particular firms in an industry are
organized. We have also proposed a framework to guide regulators in
managing these policy disruptions when they arise, suggesting that a
normative goal of neutrality between incumbents and innovators
should be the default. Given the context-specific nature of existing legal
rules, it is beyond the scope of our analysis to answer a related
question-which policy tools or specific legal rules regulators might
choose a priori, before confronting a specific policy disruption. In the
interests of furthering this important research question, though, we
wish to emphasize two fundamental points.
First, as we demonstrated in Part II, the problem of business
innovation creating policy disruption is a recurring one. Regulators
must therefore ask whether there are ways to design regulatory
systems or public policy instruments more neutrally in the first place,
so that legal rules are less likely to create such policy disruptions and
better able to fold in business innovation in the future. This point is
particularly salient if regulators adopt a NewReg strategy. When
crafting new legal rules, it may be tempting to consider only the public
policy implications of the latest business innovation. 143 Indeed, in a
number of states, Tesla has obtained legislative or regulatory
permission to sell directly to consumers without encumbrance, the Free
Pass model. In doing so, however, it has often successfully lobbied for
legislation that grants the power to sell directly to Tesla alone, blocking
off any future additional competitors.144 Regulators should consider
whether they are simply recreating the same problem of tying new
regulations too tightly to today's "new" business model, which may have
implications for the innovations of the future. Solving one policy
disruption may set up a future conflict.
Second, there are certain types of policy instruments that may
fit better with a normative goal of neutrality. For example, general
permits may be particularly useful in this context. 145 Regulators could
adopt a general permit program and apply it broadly to an entire field-
for example, transportation-for-hire or short-term housing rentals.
General permit systems impose low, minimal, or no compliance burdens
143. See Pollman & Barry, supra note 11, at 442-47 (discussing limitations of regulatory
entrepreneurship).
144. Id.
145. Eric Biber & J.B. Ruhl, The Permit Power Revisited: The Theory and Practice of
Regulatory Permits in the Administrative State, 64 DUKE L.J. 133, 232-33 (2014) (suggesting that
regulatory permits may be appropriately flexible to address new firms in the platform economy).
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on regulated parties, so long as certain conditions are met. 146 For
instance, the wetlands regulatory program under Section 404 of the
Clean Water Act uses a general permit program to allow a wide range
of relatively low-impact and common everyday activities (such as the
installation of navigation equipment in waterways or small-scale
residential development) to occur with minimal or no paperwork.
General permits could allow new business models to start up at a "pilot"
level while the impacts of the new business model remain relatively
minimal, affording regulators a chance to study its impacts and
integration.147 Such a permit could terminate in one of two ways. First,
the permit could operate expressly for a limited period of time and
automatically sunset after that time period ended. If the new business
model has proved successful, then a new permanent regulatory
program would have to be developed to manage it, again keeping in
mind our three-step process for weighing competing values. By the time
of the sunset, presumably the new business model (if it is successful)
will have enough resources and political power that it can ensure that
its voice is heard in the political and regulatory process. There could be
a provision for automatic termination if certain conditions are
triggered. Once the impacts of a new business model rise above a certain
level-for instance, a certain number of cars are operating under a new
ride-sharing business model on the streets of a city, or a significant
number of homeowners want to rent out spare rooms on Airbnb-then
a more permanent solution might be required. 148 Again, the growth of
the new business model during the general permitting stage would
allow the gathering of information about what its impacts are, what the
appropriate regulatory structure would be, and also for the new
business model to grow enough to ensure it has a voice in the political
and regulatory process.
Two other policy instruments likewise may promote the ends of
neutrality better than other kinds of tools. Upstream policy
instruments like taxes or cap-and-trade systems can avoid regulating
the downstream provider of service to customers entirely.149 Such
146. Id.
147. Cortez, supra note 40, at 218-20 (noting possibility of permit programs that are developed
as pilots but are subject to sunset provisions).
148. See Zale, supra note 3 (developing the concept of conditional triggers).
149. Cf. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global Climate Change: Why
a Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming Than Cap and Trade, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
3, 6-9 (2009) (advocating an upstream carbon tax to regulate greenhouse gas emissions); Robert
N. Stavins, A Meaningful Cap-and-Trade System to Address Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L.




instruments would be particularly useful to address the impacts of
business innovation on third parties, like environmental impacts. For
example, an upstream tax on carbon would be neutral as between a taxi
firm, Uber, and a private individual driving her own vehicle.
Alternatively, some form of informational regulation or governance
could easily be made neutral as between incumbents and innovators.1 5 0
Responsibility for information disclosure would be on the platform to
share information about its impacts, its costs, and its benefits.1 5 1
Information disclosure can serve either as an end in itself or as a
method to improve substantive legal rules, including permit
programs. 152 Whether the platform "owns" vehicles or "rents" them from
drivers, or "owns" rooms or "rents" them from Airbnb hosts, the
platform is the best locus for regulatory action.
There is much more work to be done in this space. 153 To be clear,
though, the acceleration of technological innovation means that the
problems of new business models clashing with regulatory structures
will only increase. Designing regulatory structures that are both
resilient enough to protect society from harm and also flexible enough
to facilitate the development of new business models that benefit society
will remain a challenge for legal scholars, policymakers, and
stakeholders. We have shown that this challenge is bigger than a recent
business innovation (even one as far-reaching as the platform economy),
and not a question of "demons and angels" on either side. Instead, the
problem of policy disruption is an inevitable and necessary consequence
of market forces in the administrative state. Our framework provides a
clear, general basis for analysis that can guide these difficult but
necessary decisions today and into the future.
150. Cf. James Salzman, Beyond the Smokestack: Environmental Protection in the Service
Economy, 47 UCLA L. REV. 411, 457-58 (1999) (exploring economic methods of governance).
151. Id. at 473-74 (citing Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs
of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 889 (1984)).
152. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Bottlenecks and Baselines: Tackling Information Deficits in
Environmental Regulation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1409, 1412-13 (2008) (discussing benefits and
drawbacks of informational regulation); Sarah E. Light, NEPA's Footprint: Information Disclosure
as a Quasi-Carbon Tax on Agencies, 87 TUL. L. REV. 511, 519-25 (2013) (discussing rationales for
information disclosure and surveying literature).
153. For instance, if regulatory agencies are subject to capture by incumbent regulated parties,
then regulatory agencies will be less open to the analysis and creative solutions that we believe
are necessary to facilitate business innovation while promoting the public interest. For a
discussion of how to reduce the risk of capture of regulatory agencies, see Rachel E. Barkow,
Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010).
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